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THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE.

A CONSIDERATION OF MEANS
FOR THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE BRITISH COLONIES
IN AN
IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

BY
WILLIAM BOUSFIELD, M.A.

LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 55, CHURCH LANE.

1877.

[PRICE TWO SHILLINGS.]



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PREFACE.



THIS pamphlet took its origin in the strong convictions of the author that the prosperous fortunes of Great Britain and of her people were, and must be in the future, inextricably bound up with those of the other communities of British race scattered throughout the world, and especially with those that are now united under the shadow of her empire; and that a failure on the part of Englishmen now to recognize this truth must lead them to danger and to disaster.

No one can be more sensible than he is of the extreme incompleteness and imperfection of his attempt to consider one of the most gigantic questions of the present age. If he had seen that the men, who most justly command the confidence of Englishmen, and to whom they rightly look for advice on subjects, which not only require the exercise of practical wisdom, but also reasoning from the past and a long look into the future, were occupying themselves with this truly national concern, he would have hesitated to publish any of his own views, however well founded he might have believed them to be. But this has not been the case, and he has therefore ventured to tread on ground that might justly have been considered beyond his reach, if it had been previously occupied. It is his hope, that as even the smallest effort may, in concert with others, have some result, so may this have the effect, either of, in some degree, drawing the attention of the public to this great question, or of persuading some thinker of earnestness and weight to devote his abilities to its solution.

There are many matters, such as the consideration of the number of members best fitted for carrying on the work of an Imperial House of Commons, which have been omitted, although they fall within the proper limits of the discussion in this pamphlet. The author has considered their omission preferable to further increasing its bulk.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE EMPIRE.

No patriotic Englishman who regards the progress already made by his race in civilization, and in spreading it throughout the world, can look forward, without hope and confidence, to the part that race is destined to play in the future history of mankind. That this part will probably be a predominant one, the organized colonies of Great Britain, covering vast tracts of land in the most important parts of the globe, and apparently settled beyond chance of dispossession, are a proof. The causes also which have produced this development are still at work. The material prosperity that has allowed early marriages, the magnificent improvidence with which they have been entered into, and the large families resulting therefrom, show no signs of diminution; while the enterprise continues which has transferred our redundant population to unoccupied or uncivilized countries in the temperate zones, and has formed communities of our countrymen in every part of the world for the purposes of commerce. As long as these outlets remain, we may look with satisfaction on any possible increase of our numbers, and even the individual hardships thereby produced, and must guard only, by stringent sanitary regulations, against a deterioration of physical type, and by a watchful discrimination of almsgiving, both legal and voluntary, against the moral evil of pauperism.

The genius of the race has not been less displayed by the facility with which it has peopled our colonies, and has organized governments in them, than in the administrative power, shown especially by the educated classes, in ruling, with justice and for the general benefit, vast numbers of the people of alien races in India and the plantation colonies. England is not only a European power, an Asiatic power, a Colonial power, a Maritime power, a Christian power, and a Mahommedan power; she is a world-power, perhaps the only, certainly the greatest, world-power.

We are so familiar with these facts, that a confidence has been created in our minds, both in the prosperous future of our race, and in the wisdom of continuing to rely unhesitatingly on the policy by which our present position with regard to our Colonial Empire has been attained. This policy has not been part of any wide and general scheme for national extension, but has been one of expediency, treating, as occasion required, and with little regard for uniformity, the circumstances of the various settlements of Englishmen. The process has, however, been one of growth, the true source of strength and per-

manence; and an empire has sprung up around us, full of life, full of promise, but without unity, unsettled, disjointed, fragmentary, and containing on every side opposing forces, powerful enough, if misdirected and unharmonized, to effect its disruption.

The object of this paper is to make a few suggestions, as to the means by which our position can be organized and strengthened, and by which the development of the empire may proceed as vigorously as before, but within lines insuring unity and permanence.

There is a very general consent that it is for the benefit of both England and her colonies, that a connection should be maintained between them as long as it is practicable and consonant, as now, with the wishes of Englishmen in all parts of the empire. I shall not attempt to analyze these benefits in an exhaustive manner, but will mention a certain number of them which affect both the mother-country and the colonies. The benefits to England herself, are both actual and prospective, and great as are the former of these in giving Great Britain profitable outlets for her surplus population and capital, her trade and energy, it may be that future and more comprehensive advantages ought to have the greater weight upon English opinion.

Great Britain has now a population so large, as to render it improbable that it can ever maintain a very large increase of its numbers. But even if this were found practicable, still the maximum must some time be reached, and that within a limited period.

In every healthy community the population is constantly increasing, and it may confidently be expected to do so here. It is therefore necessary to look forward to a time when the whole of this constant increase will have to be exported to other lands in search of subsistence. It will be of the deepest interest to the mother-country, where her emigrant sons shall betake themselves, whether to places in which they will retain their character as Englishmen, such as her colonies and dependencies are, or to other countries, in which they will be absorbed into, and become part of nations, either actually or possibly hostile to her. It cannot, I think, be doubted that it will be then a very great advantage to her to have suitable and rising colonies to which to send her surplus population. But if it were made a practice to abandon our present colonies as soon as they were in any way able to support themselves, no such places would remain in her possession, or be available for acquisition by her for the purpose. All those who value the corporate influence of Great Britain, as well as the individual influence of Englishmen as a power exercised throughout the world, in favour of free government, free trade, and freedom generally, would regret to see it dissipated and neutralized by subdivision and internal dissension.

It is also improbable that the relative superiority of England to her colonies will always continue. We cannot look forward with any certainty to a

perpetual continuance of the commercial prosperity which has enabled England to attain her present position, and which now enables her to support the whole cost of empire. History shows that a vigorous people, commercial aptitude, and a command of the sea, have not prevented the decay of the Italian Republics, and of Holland; and though Great Britain, no doubt, holds a stronger natural position than they ever did, a change in the course of trade, the growth of a maritime power able to interfere with our present practical monopoly of the carrying trade of the world, or a diminution of our power of underselling other nations in manufactures, would produce a rapid decline of our commercial importance, to be followed by as rapid a lowering of our population. But whatever may be in store for these islands, there can be little doubt that no decadence of the British race generally is to be feared; and, if we in England now, while it is still in our power, succeed in fixing, with a wise and generous comprehension, such lines of government as will insure the political unity of the race, our descendants here may look with cheerfulness upon even a declining home trade, and have reflected upon themselves the rising greatness of their countrymen in Australasia, America, and Africa. Far from having to abandon, in weakness or decrepitude, such a noble work as the government of the empire of India, or see it pass into other hands, they would find themselves aided in their task by their brother Englishmen in every part of the globe. Thus a continued connection with the colonies may be to England in the nature of insurance.

It is equally the interest of the colonies to maintain a close connection with the mother-country and with each other. The due development of all of them is greatly dependent upon three things: 1st. The maintenance of public security from war, from revolution, and from attacks or insurrections of native races; 2nd. Upon a sufficient supply of capital requisite for commencing and carrying out new undertakings; as well as, 3rd. Upon facilities for obtaining a due importation of labour. All these requisites are supplied by the connection now existing with the mother-country.

(1) The combination of all the various countries inhabited by Englishmen under one Imperial Government is a sufficient protection from war among themselves. It is difficult to believe that if the restraining hand of the mother-country were taken away, the colonies would long remain on good terms with each other. Our experience has shown that, even under present circumstances, the relations of the various local governments, in Canada, in Australia, and South Africa, have not been always friendly, and their antagonism would be greatly extended if each colony, without any check for the general interest, could legislate, and take measures to the extent of war, as its fancied requirements for the moment might demand. The energy so necessary to fulfil the mission of civilization and the development of the waste places of the earth, would be in danger of being expended in intestine struggles. On this point I

may quote the opinion of Sir George Cornwall Lewis, who remarks :* " It would appear from the perpetual hostilities between the republics of ancient Greece and Italy, and between those of Italy in the Middle Ages, that a multiplicity of independent and small states multiplies the chances of war. It is certain, moreover, that the mutual wars of the numerous independent states subdued by the Roman arms, were extinguished by their common subjection to the Imperial city; and that the peace of the civilized world was commonly preserved by the Imperial Government, so long as the dependence of the provinces was not substantially impaired."

It has been said that the British Empire is the greatest of coalitions, and the united weight of it is sufficient to render any external attack from an equal power very improbable. It has in the past secured English colonies from the covetousness of foreign states which might have attempted to govern upon despotic principles. By it also the whole power of Englishmen is available for repressing native inroads, and the knowledge of this latent power both gives the colonists most liable to them, confidence and prevents the policy of extermination, which is too often regarded as the safest course for small communities, composed of men of civilized races and surrounded by large masses of those of inferior ones. Sir George Lewis says,† " With respect to wars, the colonial policy of England has been successful in preventing them in the dependencies of English origin. The war with the American colonies belongs to a period when the extent of the Imperial control was as yet undefined, and when the colonial problem had not been worked out. The Canadian war of 1837 principally grew out of the mixture of races in that province, and the feelings of the French population of Lower Canada. Our recent colonial wars have been against neighbouring aborigines."

The English connection has been equally a security against insurrection. I make no apology for again quoting Sir George Lewis, who, in his 'Dialogue on the Best Form of Government,' p. 98, says, through one of his debaters, "The legal supremacy of the mother-country, capable in any extreme case of being called into activity, operates as a check upon the excesses of the democratic spirit." Moreover, a wide and educated public opinion has been much more easily brought to bear upon selfishness in any political or social order or clique than is possible in a limited community. The weight caused by the consent of a great empire renders the support of any abuse, maintained in some local interest, extremely difficult. Such would be even more the case if colonists had some share in the general government; we might then look forward with confidence that they would continue accustomed, as Englishmen now are, to surrender whatever the majority should pronounce to be against the public

* 'Government of Dependencies,' p. 249.

† 'Dialogue on the Best Form of Government,' p. 109.

good of the empire. If the Northern and Southern States of the North American Republic had remained parts of the British Empire, the late war between them would have been impossible.

(2) Nor are the colonies less indebted to England for the requisite supply of capital to stimulate their commercial enterprise. England is the great lender of the world, because it is there only that the increase of wealth exceeds what is required for home use. Any connection, therefore, having the effect of promoting the transference of its surplus accumulations to places where they are thus needed, is of the greatest benefit to our colonists. That our connection with them has the effect of so promoting a transference of capital is proved by the low rate of interest at which colonies and colonial cities are able to borrow in the London market, and by the number of English trust deeds under which securities in the colonies are accepted as investments. The English lender believes that he will get his money again; because the resources of the colony will be fostered under British rule; because British courts administer justice; because no civil war is likely to break out, or the colony to be attacked by foreign enemies; and because he believes a national public opinion will secure that his interests are treated fairly. The British Government has also directly advanced money to her dependencies. This is shown in detail in Sir John Lubbock's article in the 'Nineteenth Century Review,' for March 1877, on the 'Imperial Policy of Great Britain,' which should be read by everyone who takes an interest in the present position of England with regard to her dependencies. He points out that from 1859 to 1869 this expenditure amounted altogether to over £41,000,000, and though since that period the annual sums expended for them have decreased, owing to her ceasing to pay the colonial military expenses, this subsidy in the year 1875 still exceeded £1,500,000. He also explains that the navy is entirely paid for by the thirty millions of Englishmen in Great Britain and Ireland, while two hundred millions of our countrymen in the colonies and in India, who reap many of the benefits it confers, pay scarcely anything for it. Since the year 1830 the British Government has either advanced or guaranteed loans to our colonies for over £7,000,000. I may also remark, that the facility by which a government, with the prestige and influence of the British, can assist commercial interest, is of value to the colonies, particularly as no local government could have anything like the same weight in negotiating with foreign powers.

(3) It has been much discussed whether English connection with the colonies has the effect of specially promoting emigration of labour to them in preference to other localities. Emigration is at present so entirely dependent on the emigrant's own wishes, that the sole powers that the British Government exercise with regard to it, are those of regulating the means of transit, and of giving public warning if it believes that large numbers of labourers are being

attracted to other countries by untrue statements. The latter function has recently been exercised in the case of emigration to Brazil, where English emigrants had learnt by sad experience that fertile soil and a magnificent country were no compensation for insecurity of government amongst an alien race. It follows, therefore, that the most favourite fields for emigration will be those which are most prominently brought before the notice of persons willing to emigrate, as insuring good prospects of success, and to which they can proceed at the smallest cost to themselves. The United States, from their comparative nearness to Great Britain, and the consequent cheapness of transit, have had great advantages in procuring labour, and these advantages have increased as each succeeding emigrant left friends behind him, whom he often attracted by his example. Now, however, from various causes, of which the undue development of the large American cities is a prominent one, the tide of emigration to the States has almost ceased, though it will probably again revive in some degree. The position and natural advantages of the United States must, as long as property is secure there, always render them the most formidable rival of the colonies in attracting emigrants. On the other hand, the political connection of the colonies with England supplies a means for bringing their circumstances to the notice of the English public, and this would be vastly more the case if colonial representation in Imperial matters were adopted, when arrangements for systematized emigration to the colonies would probably be made an Imperial question. Even as it is, the fact that emigration to a foreign country involves a change of allegiance, has an influence in attracting a class of emigrants, and that the best class, to our colonies. It is impossible within these limits to discuss as it deserves, the complicated question of emigration and its relation to Imperial interests, but it may be said generally, that the fact that the colonies remain parts of the empire has weight, and may have much greater weight, in attracting English labour to them, and that the home connection cannot possibly, except in the case of persons whom any community had better be without, have a deterring effect on emigration.

Besides the advantages of union which I have mentioned, there is another, less material, but perhaps even more likely to draw the colonies towards us with the cords of affection. It is the desire of colonists to continue to share directly in the deeds of Englishmen, and in the inheritance of those great names, in literature, science, and arts, already produced, and to be produced by Great Britain—in fact, to be Englishmen, with all that the name imports.

I shall now attempt to show that it is absolutely necessary, in order to maintain any lasting connection between England and her colonies, that some wide, practical, and simple scheme of union should be agreed upon, without delay, towards effecting which our policy should be unswervingly directed. Up to the present time no such scheme has ever been brought prominently before

the public, though several propositions have attracted momentary attention. English statesmen, without having any definite aim towards which they could point their efforts, have been willing to shape their colonial policy according to the immediate pressure of circumstances. The fortunes of the colonies have drifted with the tide, but the tide has never set away from home. Glimpses, however, of a new spirit have been seen, and there are signs that both the public and public men are more deeply interested in the colonies than was formerly the case, and would be loth to see any of the ties weakened which bind them to the mother-country. The successful Confederation of the Dominion of Canada, and the attempt of Lord Carnarvon to consolidate our South African colonies, mark the commencement of a more defined action on the part of the Home Government, and are a sign that the doctrines, that benefit would accrue both to England and to her colonies from separation, which were formerly urged by persons of weight, have ceased to have any great hold upon the public mind. As long as any doubt existed, whether it might not become the creed of a great political party, that separation was inevitable, and should be accelerated, all action for the consolidation of the empire was paralyzed.

That this question has now been set at rest is due to the patriotic instincts of the people generally, who, both at home and in the colonies, regarded the political unity of the race as a fact of greater importance, and having a more practical bearing on politics than did some of their ordinary political teachers. As Mr. Herman Merivale* most truly says, "The sense of national honour, pride of blood, the tenacious spirit of self-defence, the sympathies of kindred communities, the instincts of a dominant race, the vague but generous desire to spread our civilization and our religion over the world, these are impulses which the student in his closet may disregard, but the statesman dares not, for they will assuredly prevail, as they so often have prevailed before, and silence mere utilitarian argument whenever a crisis calls them forth."†

At the outset, it must be admitted that our present relation with regard to our colonies can only, of its nature, be a temporary one, and must give way, sooner or later, either to a more complete union, or to complete disunion. This may be maintained, although we may allow that there are some advantages in

* 'Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,' ed. 1861, Lecture xxii., app. p. 645.

† In Mr. C. Buxton's 'The Ideas of the Day on Policy,' published in 1868, the following are given as the opinions of a large part of the public on colonial questions. I do not think that they can be regarded as representing the views of any considerable section of either educated men or of the people now. He says, p. 123, "Some politicians would sever the tie that still binds us to the colonies, and leave them, not merely to self-government, but to independence.

"1. They seek this, first, on the principle, that with nations as with men, dependence weakens, independence strengthens, character.

"2. The idea that this would be a cheaper policy.

"3. The idea that it would be a more peaceful one, as lessening the points of contact, and therefore of possible war between us and other nations. This has been especially felt with regard to Canada."

the existing mode of connection. As Sir George Cornwall Lewis, in his 'Dialogue on the Best Form of Government' (page 110), says, "The modern English system of dependencies admits of the successful government of a larger surface of the earth as one empire than any system which has hitherto been devised. An almost indefinite number of new dependencies might be aggregated to the British Empire, without deranging the constitution, or disturbing the action, of the Imperial Government. The practical limit seems to be expense of military and naval defence, which falls principally on the Imperial exchequer, and to which the dependencies (with the important exception of India) make little or no contribution." But as he subsequently points out, the system of dependence upon another government for some of the most important attributes of government, is suited only to weak communities, and could not be retained by those of advanced civilization and large population.

The colonies are theoretically parts of British soil, which we are bound, in case of war, to defend at any cost as our own shores, and cannot without disgrace abandon; and they are inhabited by men who are Englishmen, and have as keen a sense of our national honour as those who live at home, but who cannot, without breaking custom adhered to since the rebellion of American colonies, be called upon by the Imperial Parliament, to pay one single penny towards their own defence. In the first extended war in which we may embark, particularly with a naval power, it will be absolutely necessary to define, as it were at the cannon's mouth, and at the point of the bayonet, a position which we have neglected to determine during years of peace. For the Home Government would then be in this position—either (1) it would be obliged to defend the flourishing colonial cities at its own expense; or (2), against precedent, tax the colonies for so doing, a proceeding sure to arouse jealousy and resistance; or (3) leave the colonists themselves to defend their own shores.

In the first case, the strain upon the resources of England would be greater than she could bear. But for the great increase of English wealth, which has been partly acquired by trade with the colonies themselves, the United Kingdom could not have afforded the whole of the Imperial funds, and it would be unreasonable and unjust to it to propose that it should permanently do so. This is no doubt a question of time. The relative importance of the colonies to Great Britain must become greater, and with their greatness, their duties to the empire of which they are members, will acquire more importance. The inequality of the present system would not attract so much notice in a war in which special efforts were not needed on their behalf, but in a war such as we are supposing, this would be the case.

In the other cases, difficulties with the colonies would almost certainly arise which would greatly impair our strength and prestige, even if they did not produce a disintegration of the empire.

I believe that to attempt to tax our colonies under present circumstances would certainly prove disastrous. On this point, we have had a lesson that we can never forget, and we should run the risk, if we attempted to enforce such taxation in time of war, not merely of failing to get our money, but of getting an additional enemy into the bargain. For it must be remembered that it would be always open to a disaffected colony, threatened by the enemy, to make a separate peace, or even a hostile alliance, on the footing of severing its fortunes from ours.

Again, the defence of each colony at its own expense, without reference to other parts of the empire, would cause a severance of its interests from those of the empire, and would amount to a practical independence of the mother-country. It would also be the most inefficient form of defence. A general commanding purely local forces, not acting in concert with the regular troops of the empire, would, although perhaps appointed by the Home Government, find himself unable to use his forces in any way not sanctioned by the public opinion of the colony to which the forces belonged, or to take part in the organized defence of a neighbouring colony, however urgent the need might be. The same difficulties would probably arise in the uncertain case of voluntary gifts to the Imperial Government by the colonists, though that such gifts would be made is against our past experience. There would be a danger that each colony would require the allocation of its grants to special works on its own shores, or to the maintenance of a local militia, and would view with jealousy the expenditure of funds, collected locally, on the general defence of the empire, in pursuance of a policy in the direction of which its citizens had no voice.

There are other questions of Imperial policy, of which it is unfair that the home countries should bear the sole burden, but which, apparently, cannot at present be settled in any other manner.

The Imperial Government has lately, at its own expense, and in consequence of the earnest request of our Australian fellow-countrymen, accepted the cession of the Fiji Islands. The colonies, which were most interested in the annexation, were asked to contribute towards the cost incurred, but they all refused to do so. On a subsequent request, made by the Australian colonies to Lord Carnarvon, to annex New Guinea to the possessions of the British Crown, he, though declining to do this at present, stated that as such an annexation would be principally for the advantage of Australia, Great Britain should not be asked to incur heavy expenditure for the purpose, unshared by any Australian colony.

In commenting upon this answer, the correspondent of the 'Standard' newspaper in Melbourne stated that Australians boldly challenged the principle of these views—that certain portions of the empire should furnish funds towards the acquisition of new territory for the empire at large, and continued: "Is it

to be understood or laid down as a doctrine that for the future no remote dependency of Great Britain is to derive assistance from the State without paying an amount to be assessed on some definite basis? For this is really the question arising out of Lord Carnarvon's despatches having reference to Fiji and New Guinea, and a very important question it is—one which should be settled before any one part of the empire shall conceive it has cause for discontent because it has been called on for payments which have not been exacted from other portions under similar conditions."

A discussion of the relation of our colonies to the Home Government is enough to show that there are questions of primary importance in the fundamental constitution of the British Empire which require settlement, and this will have to be done either at a time of peace, such as the present, when men, both here and in the colonies, can regard the questions and principles at stake with calm and unbiassed minds, or in the excitement and pre-occupation of war, and under pressure of immediate necessity. I would submit that it is the duty of every Englishman, to whom the honour and interest of his country are dear, to turn his attention at once to the proper definition of the rights and obligations of our colonies, in order that we may, in the time of peril, present over our vast territories an unbroken and unwavering front to the enemy.

It is probable that but for the secession of the United States in the last century we should have been before this forced to settle the precise relations of the mother-country to the colonies—a settlement which would have involved some arrangement for colonial representation. The great spread of the English race in America, its comparative proximity to England, and the enormous interests at stake, would have prevented a merely temporizing colonial policy, possible towards less advanced settlements. Whether, in such a case, the lines of union would at first have been marked out in as broad and liberal a spirit as they may be in the future, is perhaps doubtful. The schemes for Imperial comprehension, which were advocated previous to this secession, planned the centralization in England of all branches of colonial government, and did not provide for the local self-government which subsequent experience has proved both to be practicable and not to be necessarily destructive of the Imperial tie.

It is very necessary that any arrangements for the closer political connection of the scattered members of the British race with England must, to insure their adoption in the first instance, and to produce strength and permanence afterwards, be laid on lines adapted to the habits of the people, so as to impair neither freedom nor sense of local responsibility. One of the greatest qualities of Englishmen, wherever they are found, is their power of local self-government, and the habit has been, by our policy towards the colonies, developed to its utmost. Perhaps the only principle from which our colonial policy has for the

last thirty years never swerved, is that of compelling the colonies to govern themselves. This may in some cases have been carried too far, but it has had the effect of generally producing stable and self-reliant communities. Self-government has, however, proceeded in accordance with English traditions, and in no case has local development gone on in a path diverging greatly from home experience. Colonists have also been most sensible of English public opinion, and though resenting interference in purely colonial affairs, or what they have regarded as such, have always been willing to consider calmly recommendations of the Home Government laid persuasively and without pressure before them.*

But it is, I think, incontestable that any radical change in the policy of our colonial government must be effected with the general consent of colonists, and not by any interference with the independent action to which they have become accustomed and attached. I shall therefore assume that no system of Imperial union is practicable that does not allow to each local community the same or as great power of local self-government as it has at present.

The question next arises, Can any closer political union be formed such as still to concede to the local governments forming part of it, an autonomy, as complete as that now possessed by our principal colonies? Before considering this, I will notice very briefly the respective powers possessed and exercised at present by the Home or Imperial Government, and by the colonial communities, together with certain marked distinctions amongst the latter.

Our colonies are divided into three classes, each having different forms of local government; though within these classes no two of the colonies have institutions precisely similar to each other. The classes are defined in the 'Colonial Office List,' as follows:—

(1) "Crown Colonies, in which the Crown has the entire control of legislation, while the administration is carried on by public offices, under the control of the Home Government." Of this class, the most conspicuous examples now are Jamaica and Ceylon.

(2) "Colonies possessing representative institutions, but not responsible government, in which the Crown has no more than a veto on legislation, but the Home Government retains the control of the public officers." The principal colonies of this class are the South African, and Western Australia.

(3) "Colonies possessing representative institutions and responsible government, in which the Crown has only a veto on legislation, and the Home Government has no control over any public officer except the Governor."

* If colonists have not in every case taken a sufficiently large view of the requirements of the empire generally, and have preferred provincial and local to Imperial interests, the cause may partly be found in the fact that they have no voice in central government, and have been too much encouraged by public men at home to regard their interests as apart and diverse from those of the mother-country.

A further explanation of this class of colonies is also given in the same list. It is stated that "under responsible government, the Executive Counsellors are appointed by the Governor alone, with reference to the exigencies of representative government, and other public offices by the Governor, on the advice of the Executive Council. In no appointment is the concurrence of the Home Government requisite. The control of all public departments is thus practically placed in the hands of persons commanding the confidence of a representative legislature." In this class are included the Dominion of Canada, all the Australian colonies (except Western Australia), and New Zealand.

Thus we have to deal with communities having various degrees of self-government, of which it may generally be said that the widest local powers are given to those which contain the smallest admixture of foreign races.

As it is with the colonies of the third class, to which both responsible and representative government has been granted, that difficulties would be most likely to arise, it will be sufficient for my purpose to point out, very briefly, what is their legal and practical position. The powers of their legislatures originate with the Acts of the Imperial Parliament creating them, and though these Acts differ in their terms, they all bestow the widest authority within the limits of the respective colonies to which they refer. In short, they give all that is included in the power of making laws for good government, with this restriction, that such laws cannot alter existing, and are subject to future Imperial laws.* By usage, which has not been infringed for many years, the legislatures of these colonies have alone exercised the power, determined the incidence, and directed the expenditure of the proceeds of taxation within the limits of their own colonies. They have, however, in relation to foreign governments, or generally to persons outside their boundaries, had no status separate from that of the British Government, and in cases where they have entered into contracts with strangers for borrowing money and other purposes, they have done so as a municipality or corporate body, with the sanction of the colonial Governor rather than as a separate power.

The colonial legislatures are moreover subject to the absolute authority of the Parliament of Great Britain, and to the limited authority of the Crown.

The authority of the Crown over these colonies is exercised in three ways: by military protection; by allowing and disallowing laws made by the local legislatures; and by the appointment of a Governor having certain administrative powers.

The Parliament in England, which consists of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, acting in concert, has two characters, that of the local legislature of the three kingdoms, and the wider and Imperial one, of being the supreme authority over all parts of Her Majesty's dominions. This is finely

* See Sir Edward Creasy's 'Constitutions of the Britannic Empire.'

expressed by Burke in his speech on American taxation, April 19th, 1774; and no change has since that time been made which in any way alters its position in this respect. He says,* "The Parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive empire, in two capacities: one is the local legislature of this island, providing for all things at home immediately, and by no other instrument than the executive power: the other, and I think, her nobler capacity, is what I call her Imperial character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the several inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all without annihilating any." In this Imperial capacity the Parliament in England has at present the legal right to legislate for all the dominions of the Crown, whether or not in possession of representative institutions and responsible government; and this power of legislation includes that of taxation and all other attributes of the *summa potestas civilis*.†

But although this legal right may exist, usage, based upon the English maxim, which in the minds of men of English race has the force of a moral law, that taxation and representation go together, effectually prevents Parliament at home from exercising the highest right of government, in compelling contributions towards Imperial expenditure from the unrepresented communities in the colonies. In many other branches of administration, such as the recognition of religion, experience has suggested limits to the exercise of control by the Imperial Parliament, which are not likely to be overstepped; and this experience will be most valuable by enabling us, in promoting any system of consolidation for the empire, to determine what functions should appertain to the Imperial and to the local governments respectively. The present position of the empire presents a thousand opportunities for a dead-lock, and it is due only to the aptitude for government and the self-restraint, in view of the common welfare, shown alike by colonists and English statesmen and people, that difficulties of the most serious character have been avoided. As it is stated in a letter to the 'Times' newspaper of June 1st, 1876, by Historicus, "The constitutional supremacy of the Imperial Legislature, as of right, is universal, but in practice it is never exerted in local, as distinguished from Imperial interests, or in any case where its application would not be generally recognized as just and reasonable. What these cases are must be determined by practical statesmanship. The real problem of politics is to distinguish between that which you have a right to do, and that which it is right you should do. That the Imperial Legislature has a right to legislate for the colonies cannot be disputed; how far it is right that it should do so is a matter of policy and discretion."

* Burke's Speeches, vol. i., p. 237.

† This is very clearly pointed out by Sir Edward Creasy, in his 'Constitutions of the Britannic Empire,' p. 156, where the authorities on this point are enumerated.

I would urge that it is in the separation of these two distinct functions of the British Parliament, and in the gift to the colonists of direct representation in a Parliament called solely for Imperial purposes that the true key is to be found to the permanent and effective political union of Great Britain and her colonies, and to the consolidation of the British Empire.

Since the time of Burke the germs of British colonization, that even then gave promise of a luxuriant growth, have grown into mighty trees which overshadow the world. But for the great catastrophe which his wise and eloquent appeals in Parliament were unable to prevent, of the secession of the American provinces, this growth would probably have taken place entirely within the dominion and under the purview of the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain, and the British Empire would now have been conterminous with the British race. This was, however, not the destined course of events, and in consequence many of the most interesting problems of government and national development have been worked out, and are in process of being so, outside the direct influence of home opinion and tradition. It is impossible for Englishmen not to feel both pride and interest in the progress of the United States: blood is thicker than water.

But putting on one side this great severance, the duties of the British Parliament, as it carries on the business of its wide and Imperial sway, are sufficient in their magnitude and importance to occupy and exhaust the faculties of any assembly of men, without being hampered and choked, as is the case now, with the importunate and more minute cares of a local legislature. This evil of repletion has long been growing, and with the progress of the nation's prosperity must increase more, until either some change of system is made, or one or more kinds of necessary business are, as a rule, pressed and huddled out of notice. And if the latter predicament should occur, it is not difficult to see what interests are likely to suffer most; those which appear most pressing in the ordinary life of a member of Parliament and his constituents, such as the licensing of public-houses and the reduction of the rates, important as these are, or those more remote, and less understood, which appertain to the general welfare of the empire at large and of the distant colonies. And it must be also remembered that as the tendency is nowadays for constituents to elect representatives to the House of Commons for local reasons, and to advance local objects, so will these men both prefer to direct their energies to local matters, and be of a class incompetent to form independent opinions of value on the more important questions of Imperial policy. At the present moment the discussion of such questions is in the hands of a few members, to whom either extended views or personal experience have caused them to be interesting; and the policy of the Colonial Office is directed by the Minister of the day without any check, and except in case of expenditure from Imperial funds or of wide-

spread disturbance, without any remark in Parliament. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that unless some public disaster in the colonies should impend, colonial policy could be of sufficient weight to determine the formation or rejection of any Ministry.

The present unsatisfactory state of affairs has long been acknowledged, and was lately remarked upon by the Home Secretary; and several propositions have already been made for delegating much of the local authority now exercised by Parliament, either to other elective bodies, or to administrative agents.

I would maintain that both local and Imperial interests are of such importance that they require complete and undivided attention from the representative bodies to which they are entrusted, and that they are of such a character that each is, in the majority of cases, best served by a different kind of men from those which are of most use in the other. Many men are of course equally fitted to grasp and superintend both the wider and more contracted interests of England, and for the sake of unity of policy it is most desirable that they should continue to exercise an influence upon both of them. It would be proper and practicable that this should be provided for in a Parliament reformed in an Imperial sense. There can be no doubt that there exists in Great Britain an abundance of suitable men to represent her various interests, both in an Imperial and a local Parliament, and the real difficulty of late years has not been to find men who are worthy to be members of the House of Commons, but to get them elected to it. Population, and with it the number of educated and enlightened men, have enormously increased, while the number of members of Parliament remains a comparatively fixed one.

The dream of colonial representation in an Imperial Parliament has fascinated the minds of many men of genius who have thought and speculated on the future of the British constitution, even of those who have believed that the difficulties in its way rendered it impracticable. A century ago Adam Smith wrote in the 'Wealth of Nations,' on the eve of the secession of the American colonies,* "There is not the least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal perhaps arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people, both on this and on the other

* Murray's ed., 1870, p. 493.

side of the Atlantic." The views of this great thinker, expressed in the 'Wealth of Nations,' have already moulded and transformed the opinions of his countrymen on the principles which underlie the transactions of trade, have caused an entire change in the scheme of our commercial legislation, and may perhaps yet prevail, in the matter of colonial representation.

In Mr. Burke's great speech in Parliament, on March 22, 1775, upon his resolutions for conciliation with the American colonies, he said: * "My idea, therefore, without considering whether we yield as a matter of right, or grant as a matter of favour, is *to admit the people of our colonies into an interest in the constitution.*" And subsequently, in the same speech: † "You will now, Sir, perhaps imagine that I am on the point of proposing to you a scheme for the representation of the colonies in Parliament. Perhaps I might be inclined to entertain some such thought; but a great flood stops me in my course. *Opposuit natura.* I cannot remove the eternal barriers of creation. The thing in that mode I do not know to be possible. As I meddle with no theory, I do not absolutely assert the impracticability of such a representation. But I do not see my way to it, and those who have been more confident have not been more successful. However, the arm of public benevolence is not shortened, and there are often many means to the same end. What nature has disjointed in one way, wisdom may unite in another. When we cannot give the benefit as we would wish, let us not refuse it altogether. If we cannot give the principal, let us find a substitute." And again later: ‡ "My trust is in her (America's) interest in the British constitution. My hold of the colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are strong as links of iron. Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government; they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven will be of power to tear from their allegiance."

These extracts show the spirit of Mr. Burke, and that though he regarded colonial representation as incompatible with the resources of the empire a hundred years ago, he would have hailed it as the principal benefit which could be accorded to our dependencies, if it had been possible. The Nature that opposed his wishes has been overcome by the invention and energy of his successors; the eternal barriers of the creation have been bridged and overthrown by steam and the telegraph. But the lesson that he tried to teach has been learnt; and since the great catastrophe of his time, no English colony has loosened the tie which binds it to the British Crown. Who can tell what he would deem possible now, if he could live again? The objections on other grounds, which he made elsewhere in his speeches, to colonial representation in England, do not apply to representation for purely Imperial affairs, but to the

* Burke's Speeches, vol. i., p. 305.

† *Ibid.*, p. 314.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

proposition that had been made—that the sole control of purely local matters, in the colonies, should be left to a central representative body. I may also remark that he was of opinion that direct grants for Imperial purposes would, and ought to be, made to the Crown by colonial legislatures ; but this, experience has proved, has not been the case.

Mr. Joseph Hume, the economist, Mr. W. E. Forster, Sir Edward Creasy, and other eminent Englishmen, have at various times expressed themselves in favour of colonial representation for Imperial purposes.

The difficulties caused by distance from the central power which formerly existed, such as the length of time necessary for representatives from the colonies to come for attendance at a Parliament in England, and to discover the sentiments of colonists on questions of importance, have already been obviated by steam and the telegraph, and may in process of time be still further removed. At present the transmission of news is much more rapidly accomplished, and the transit of persons little less so, from the most remote colonies to London, than was the case, from one part of the kingdom to the other, in the early days of the English Parliament.

What I would urge, then, is that a true Imperial Parliament, having its seat in London, be created by the reform of the present Parliament, consisting of the Crown, an hereditary House, and an elective body with representatives from the United Kingdom, and from every colony having representative institutions ; and that this Parliament should possess, over every part of Her Majesty's dominions, the supreme power now vested in the present British Parliament. That under this Imperial Parliament there should be in the United Kingdom, and in each colony, or confederation of colonies, a local legislature, having the power of taxation within its own limits, and allowed, subject to the veto of the Crown, to legislate uncontrolled in all affairs within those limits ; and that this veto should not be exercised except where, in the opinion of the Imperial Ministers of the Crown, the proposed legislation was against the general interests of the empire. That the Imperial Parliament should assume the sole supervision of the foreign policy, and the defence by land and sea, of the empire ; the control of the Crown colonies and of the great dependencies, such as India, belonging to the empire ; also of the communications, telegraphic and postal, between its various parts ; and the maintenance and appointment of the Imperial Courts of Appeal. That for this purpose the Crown should appoint Imperial Ministers, who should retain office, as at present, at the pleasure of the Imperial Parliament, and that these Ministers should consist of a Prime Minister, who would be acquainted with home affairs, and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for War, and for the Admiralty, for the Colonies, for India, for Finance, and for Commerce and Communications. To these might, perhaps, be added a Judicial Minister, to watch over the codification of the law, its assimilation,

where practicable, in various parts of the empire, and the working of the Imperial Courts of Appeal in England.

Of the effect which such a change would have upon the local legislature for the United Kingdom, I propose subsequently to treat.

I am most fully sensible of the extreme difficulties which would arise in any attempt to carry out such a scheme, or indeed any other scheme for the consolidation of the empire, and of the improbability that, even if its main principle, the separation of the Imperial and local functions exercised by the present Parliament, should ever be adopted, the details I am now sketching would be accepted as worthy of notice; nevertheless, I have determined to continue these, though futile, as illustrations of my proposition. I believe however, that the changes in the constitution here proposed are the smallest which could be adopted, if a uniform plan giving equal rights to Englishmen in all parts of the empire, be regarded as the necessary object to be attained.

The English people, fortunately for themselves, are not in the habit of accepting cut and dried constitutions from legislators, or even at once, for good and all, adopting a new principle and carrying it out, in all branches of government, by a comprehensive enactment. On the other hand, new principles are generally evolved out of a series of tentative measures, through which the people both get accustomed to the novelty, and are enabled to test its truth. Assuredly we shall not see the unification of the empire accomplished by different means.

The Sovereign is the visible expression of the unity of the empire, even as it now exists, and is the means through which every subject, of whatever race or colour, living in any part of her dominions, realizes his relationship to all other subjects. Under no other form of government but that of a monarchy would the continuous political connection of the scattered communities of British race be in any way possible. The spirit of loyalty, which is so powerful a sentiment in the mass of people when not too much opposed to their material interests, is impossible towards an abstraction, and is greatly weakened when its object holds only a temporary position. There is every sign that this feeling of personal attachment to the Sovereign, which is taken out by emigrants from the mother-country to the colonies, is maintained unabated amongst their descendants; and it has shown itself in a marked manner during the visits of the children of our present Queen to British dependencies. Probably even now an average citizen of the United States of British descent feels a greater amount of personal devotion to Queen Victoria than he does to the President of his Republic for the time being. Mr. Herman Merivale has remarked,* that Imperial Rome for five centuries held the various races forming her empire in willing allegiance, regarding her with reverence as the fountain of laws, order,

* 'Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,' Lecture xxii.

and civilization ; and that her empire was torn asunder by foreign violence, but never divided from within. And he says : * “ May we not figure to ourselves, scattered thick as stars over the surface of this earth, communities of citizens owning the name of Britons, bound in allegiance to a British Sovereign, and uniting heart and hand in maintaining the supremacy of Britain on every shore which her unconquered flag can reach ? ”

Under any system by which a direct share in the government of the empire is given to colonists, it is to be expected that the personal influence of the Sovereign will be of vital importance. Standing in precisely the same relation to each province and subject, the occupant of the throne, unfettered by local interest, may regard with absolute impartiality any question which may arise from time to time between the various parts, and will have it in his or her power, by persuasion, and by the influence which the possessor of a position so magnificent and exalted must ever have, to foster a spirit of compromise and public-mindedness, and to harmonize and guide the conflicting desires of the various parts of the empire to the general benefit. This is a difficult task, but with the traditions of the British Monarchy it is not too much to hope that it will be met and fulfilled. It is reasonable to suppose that the powers and duties of the Crown, in administration of the Imperial Government, and as a part of the Imperial Parliament, would remain as at present ; the Crown possessing a veto in legislation, and exercising its power in according with the advice of Imperial Ministers.

English experience has shown forcibly the stability and permanence which is given to the constitution and to government by the hereditary principle, and in spite of the arguments which may be brought against it, the majority of observers are still of opinion that where, as is here the case, a nation is fortunate enough to have a wide-spread aristocracy in sympathy with popular aspirations, an hereditary legislative body composed of its chiefs, is a means of government not rashly to be discarded. It is necessary to consider what part the House of Peers should play in any revised scheme of Imperial Government. At present that House is an integral part of the Imperial Parliament ; and it certainly occupies itself in far greater proportion than is the case in the House of Commons with subjects of Imperial interest. Discussions upon foreign policy are frequent in the House of Lords, and in these there is a marked tendency to lay greater stress on the principles on which that policy should permanently be based, than on the passing phases of every question. This tendency to look below the surface of a problem, and to discover the true principles on which it rests, is also to be seen in most of the debates of the House of Lords on other subjects. It is to be remarked that since the days of Canning every Minister for Foreign Affairs, except Lord Palmerston, who might, if he had chosen, have

* ‘ Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,’ ed. 1861, p. 634.

sat in the House of Lords as a representative peer for Ireland, has been a member of that House, or has subsequently become one; and since the creation of the Colonial Office as a separate department of State, almost every Colonial Secretary has also been a peer. These and other facts tend to show that there is something in the calm atmosphere of the House of Lords, where the members hold positions unaffected by the turmoil of popular elections, peculiarly suited to the discussion and supervision of Imperial affairs. That House also contains the representatives of many of the men who have done most to place England in her present Imperial position. To take away, therefore, from the House of Lords its place as part of the Imperial Parliament, would be a revolutionary act, not demanded by the public interest.

At the same time, it would probably be necessary, if the Imperial bond should endure, to add to that body persons who should not necessarily belong to the local Parliament of Great Britain. This could be done by appointing as peers some of the most conspicuous members of the families of hereditary wealth, which are certain to arise in the colonies as their resources become more developed; and by the nomination by the Crown, as life members, of men such as past governors of colonies, diplomatists, and others, whose opinions may be valuable in Imperial politics. By this means, one of the greatest defects of the constitution of the United States, in which the richer and territorial classes are habitually excluded from political influence, would be avoided. It might also prove a politic measure to create the great subject feudatory princes of India peers, by tenure, of the Imperial Parliament, with a view to blend their interests, in a more marked manner, with those of the empire generally. There are, however, dangers in this step which might render it impracticable.

It may perhaps be objected that the numbers of the present hereditary House would form too large a proportion in a reformed Imperial House of Lords; and that the colonies would not consent to the preponderance to home interests which such an arrangement would give. I do not believe that this would be the case. It is not to be expected that the Upper House would exercise a larger or more stringent control over the Imperial policy than it does at present, and there would be no fear that its wishes would over-ride those of the representative House, in which the colonies would be directly represented, in any matter where the latter took a strong interest. But there would be this great benefit to the empire, that the traditions which have guided us so far in safety would be retained, or rendered less liable to be forgotten, during the time that change and expansion might be altering its whole appearance. There would, moreover, be great difficulty in devising any plan for diminishing the number of peers who should sit in the Imperial Upper House, which should leave it in any way the same as it is at present. Certainly the mode of election of representatives by the hereditary peers of Scotland and Ireland has not been successful.

But there is one body of men with most useful functions in the present House of Peers that we could not look to see included in a future Imperial House. I mean the bishops of the Church of England. Thirty years ago there seemed still a chance that this Church might have gone hand in hand with each community of Englishmen taking root in our colonies, recognized by each local government, and aiding it in spreading over a willing people the blessings of religion and civilization. That prospect has now vanished for ever. I believe there is a great future before the English Church in the colonies, but it will not be connected with that of the State. The principle that no one form of religion shall be specially assisted and protected has finally been recognized by almost all of them, and it would not be possible to organize an Imperial Legislature in which the colonies are represented, where any religious body should possess, as of right, certain seats in either chamber, although the appointments to fill these were made by one of the local governments acting under that Imperial Legislature. But, of course, the present restriction preventing the clergy from sitting in the House of Commons would be done away with, and bishops might be properly nominated to sit as life peers. There could be also no objection to their continuing to sit in the local House of Lords. Should such an Imperial House, as I have imagined, ever be created, the position of a member of it would be as dignified and influential as that of the holder of a seat in any legislative body which has ever existed.

I now approach the most interesting part of the question I have been considering, the pivot, in fact, upon which any scheme of Imperial reform must turn, namely, the constitution of the Imperial House of Commons. Unless it be possible to reform the present House by such an addition to or arrangement of its members, that it may be regarded with confidence and respect by all parts of Her Majesty's dominions, any change in the present state of things must be for the worse. The change here proposed, though a radical one, rests, I believe, on an equitable basis, and follows nearly the lines which natural growth has pointed out; and, I hope, will not offend any person's sense of justice. However, it may prove that even the most equitable plan may fail, either because the cohesion and common interests and sentiments of the various component parts of the empire are less than they appear to be, or because individual ambitions, the product of present want of unity, prevent the adoption of reform at the proper time.

In the first place, the essence of my proposition would be that this representative House should be the same as the old House of Commons, a continuation of its existence, but so reformed as to be better fitted to perform its Imperial functions. There are obvious advantages in continuity with the past, and they have been recognized in every great reform carried out by the English people. There is a strong analogy between the admission of the colonists to share in the

government of the British Empire, and the respective unions of Scotland and Ireland with England and Great Britain, in 1707 and 1800. In both these cases, the position of the Parliament, meeting in England, remained unaltered; the only change made was to place Scotland and Ireland under its control, and add fresh representatives from these countries. The same care to preserve continuity with the past was shown in the reform of the Church of England in the sixteenth century, and in the change of dynasty in the revolution of 1688. The effect of maintaining the legal existence of the House of Commons would be to preserve unimpaired the status and the traditions and customs of the present House, which would have these advantages: (1) That no fresh powers would be needed to give it, with the other branches of the Imperial Parliament, supreme authority in every part of Her Majesty's dominions; (2) That its present great prestige, which is most necessary to secure the consideration and respect of those it controls, would remain; and, (3) That the constitutional maxims as to its relation with the other branches of the legislature, together with the privileges and rules which are the fruit of six hundred years of national experience and development, would continue.

Undoubtedly very large reforms would be needed to make the House of Commons a representative legislative assembly for the empire. I shall endeavour to treat them as they group themselves under two heads; the delegation of the control of purely local affairs in England, Scotland, and Ireland to a subordinate legislature, and the admission of representatives from colonies having representative local government.

The first of these heads, relating to the formation of a local legislature, I propose to consider subsequently.

The admission of representatives into the House of Commons from all parts of the wide empire of England would doubtless cause many changes in its constitution and its course of business, which it is difficult to foresee, and which will have to be left to experience to settle; but there are some which depend upon principles that it is necessary should be agreed upon at the outset, as the basis upon which the lines of reform are to be set. And the foremost of these principles follows upon the answer given to the question: How is the number of representatives which each province or local unit shall send to Parliament to be fixed? Is this to depend upon some general rule to be applied to each of these units alike, or upon some arbitrary arrangement, such as may appear temporarily expedient? I would reply, without hesitation, that if the work is to be permanent, and not carry within itself the seeds of its own dissolution, it must proceed on the principle of giving relative equality to every part of Her Majesty's dominions included in its scope. To order otherwise would be to create jealousies fatal to public spirit, and perhaps never to be appeased, which

would cause an aggrieved colony to regard its local interests in any question that might arise apart from the general welfare of the empire. What I would propose, therefore, is, that representation should, throughout the empire, in the United Kingdom as in the colonies, be always strictly proportionate to population.

A difficulty no doubt arises in arranging such a proportionate representation in colonies like the West Indian Islands, which contain a large number of persons of native or negro blood. This difficulty is lessened, however, by the fact that the most important of these, such as Jamaica and Ceylon, have not representative governments, but are Crown colonies, and would not therefore, according to my proposition, share in Imperial representation, until representative local governments were granted them. In the other colonies it will probably be wiser only to include persons of European descent, except in those places where, as the Red River Settlement, the native population is being assimilated and blended with them by intermarriage, or, as in the case of the Chinese in Australia, they form orderly and civilized communities.

It would be necessary, in order to ensure a legislative body sufficiently wieldy and efficient, to reduce to some extent the number of representatives at present sent by Great Britain and Ireland. Such a reduction would involve a recasting of the entire system of home representation and the distribution of seats—a process that is inevitable, irrespective of any scheme for colonial representation. It is not necessary to discuss here the mode in which this redistribution should be made. I will only say, that though the number of Imperial representatives sent by the present constituents of the House of Commons would be less, still, taking into consideration the local House, a much larger number of representatives would have to be elected in the three kingdoms than is done under present circumstances. This consideration will have practical importance in securing the support of politicians to a scheme of colonial representation.

It is worth while for a moment to regard the present state of representation in the British Parliament. The House of Commons may be taken to contain approximately 658 members, 493 of whom are elected in England, 105 in Ireland, and 60 in Scotland. According to the last census (1871), the population of those countries together amounted to about 31,485,000, England having about 22,712,000, Ireland 5,412,000, and Scotland 3,360,000, thus giving one representative to about 47,800 persons in the whole; or, taking England, Ireland, and Scotland separately, the proportion is about one representative to 46,000, to 51,000, and to 56,000 respectively. It is more difficult to fix the number of persons of European descent living in the various colonies, but, according to the calculation given in the 'Statesman's Year Book for 1877,' the population of

the colonies having representative governments amounts to about 7,110,000, namely:—

Canada	3,579,782	New South Wales	503,981
Newfoundland	146,536	Queensland	120,104
Bahamas	39,162	South Australia	185,626
Bermudas	12,121	Victoria	731,528
Leeward Islands	120,491	Tasmania	101,785
Windward Islands	284,078	Western Australia	24,785
Cape of Good Hope	566,158	New Zealand	256,260
Natal	293,832	Channel Islands, and Isle of Man	144,638

If we then suppose that a reformed Imperial House of Commons should consist of 700 members, it would, under these circumstances, give one member to about 55,000 people. Thus, the United Kingdom and Ireland would together send to Parliament 575 members, Canada and Newfoundland 68, Australasia 35, and the whole of the colonies together, 125 members. Should it be subsequently found possible to give representation to dependencies, such as Jamaica and the other Crown colonies, the proportion of colonial members would be increased.*

As, however, the population throughout the British empire is constantly increasing, and in some parts of it at a much greater rate than in others, it is absolutely certain that to maintain approximately the proportion that representation should have to population, equalizations and adjustments will be continually necessary. Up to the present time such adjustments have not in any way been provided for by the British Constitution, and have only been made as the result and at the expense of considerable political disturbance. This has been unavoidable, and has not, on the whole, caused detriment to the State. But the case would be very different if this political disturbance were to take place throughout all parts of the empire represented in the Imperial Parliament, and which are not bound together by the inevitable natural connection which exists between the United Kingdoms. It would cause, wherever inequality was felt, discussions as to value to the aggrieved colony of the Imperial tie, and whether it was worth the trouble necessary to be taken to re-equalize representation. This, if the object in view is to maintain the empire, would be most dangerous and undesirable. I would therefore propose that at the time of admitting colonial members, Parliament should pass an Act providing for the recurrent reform at stated intervals, say of twenty-five years, of the Imperial representation on the principle of proportion on which it was originally framed, and providing for the proper taking under Imperial supervision of a census of the population

* Probably, however, at the commencement of a system of Imperial representation, a House of Commons of not much more than half the size above mentioned would be the most suited to the wants of the empire; and it would allow for future increase, as the colonies become more and more nearly the equals of the mother-country in the numbers of their inhabitants. If, at the outset, the Imperial House of Commons should contain the maximum number of representatives which would be convenient for such a body, all subsequent equalizations would have to be made by a removal of representatives from existing constituencies—a process sure to cause discontent in the parts of the empire thus affected.

in all parts of the empire as a basis of such reform. This Act would not, of course, interfere with the supreme power of future parliaments, who might amend or reject it, nor would it amount in any way to a treaty between the various component parts of the empire; but it is most unlikely that, if it were passed, the principle it laid down would be tampered with or impugned, and it would remain as the perpetual safety-valve of the constitution.

Supposing, therefore, that the number of representatives to be sent to Parliament by each unit or province of the empire were settled, it remains to be considered how, and on what principle, they are to be elected? Is it possible to devise any uniform standard of fitness for the status of an elector, to be applied alike to persons in all parts of the empire sending representatives? And if the answer is in the affirmative, then how is Parliament to arrange the mode of election—whether in electoral districts, or in cities and counties, or in one general election or *plébiscite*, for the whole province? It may very likely be that a Parliament containing representatives from all parts of the empire might, after some years' experience of the working of the system, be able to arrange some uniform qualification for voters, and general principle for the exercise of voting throughout the empire; but that would seem to be quite beyond the power of the present Parliament, which has not the complete knowledge of the facts relating to all the colonies requisite to decide so difficult a question, nor could attempt to lay down any general law, without causing unnecessary controversy and opposition. Probably the plan which would have at first the best chance of success would be that the Imperial Government should ask the local government of each colony to obtain the approval, by the local legislature, of a scheme for the exercise of the Imperial suffrage within the colony; and that this scheme should, unless it contained some clearly unjust or impolitic provisions, be included in the Imperial Act of Consolidation as the law for voting in the colony. By this means colonists would be themselves enabled to adapt the Imperial franchise to their own wants; and any inconvenience arising from want of uniformity in the various parts of the empire would be more than compensated for by the stability that their satisfaction in this important particular would give.

A further question of great importance to the success of such a scheme as is here proposed is, whether the colonists are able and willing to send to a Parliament in England as large a number of fit representatives as would be required by it? It would be too bold to prophesy that a difficulty in this would not at times occur with some of the scattered members of our extended empire; but I believe, as a rule, the burden to the colony would not be felt, and the demand for representatives would, as in the demand for other things, create the supply.* For it would be possible for the colonies to send as representatives

* Such a difficulty did occur in England during the Middle Ages, when boroughs were frequently excused, at their own request, from sending members to Parliament. This happened then without detriment to general interests; but the case is rather different now.

persons of two classes, either of which would supply able and fit members of an Imperial Parliament.

The first of these would be naturally the class from which the bulk of the members of the local legislatures are at present elected—a class mainly political by profession, the product of universal suffrage in new countries, and resembling that which engrosses political power in the United States. This class, in consequence of the activity, cleverness, and facility shown by its members in urging measures which appear to be for the pecuniary interest of the most numerous classes, has great influence, and would have enormous weight, if united, in promoting or discouraging any scheme of colonial representation. The members are not, however, as a rule, rich, and they would require that, if sent as representatives to England, this should be done at either local or Imperial expense. It is impossible not to feel that a great difficulty may arise from this fact, as the tendency of remote colonies would undoubtedly be to demand payment for their representatives from Imperial funds; while to grant this might be productive of great peril to the State, and would, perhaps, to some extent neutralize the advantages of Imperial unity. The discretion and duty of making this payment should, as a matter of public policy, be left to the local governments, the matter being a local one, and varying in each colony, according to its distance from England and its social position. There are at present signs that some of the colonies, such as Victoria, which have adopted the plan of paying the representatives in their provincial legislatures, may cease to do so. It does not seem to have produced a better or more independent class of legislators.

The other class from which colonial representatives could be drawn is that composed of the rich merchants, stock owners, and planters, who now return to England to spend the fortunes they have made in colonial enterprise. It has been the weakness of the empire, and the misfortune of the colonies, that the men who have frequently done most for the industrial development, and have the largest stake in the welfare of our rising dependencies, are practically shut out from all political power. As Mr. Herman Merivale, speaking especially of the Australian colonies, says: * “We see the higher and more educated class, as a class, politically ostracised there, as in the United States. We see them, consequently, looking to England as their home; anxious only to accumulate wealth in the colonies as fast as they may, and using such indirect power as they may still possess almost wholly for the purpose of maintaining their own pecuniary interests against apprehended encroachments of the multitude.”

It is much to be desired in the general interest that these men should have some outlet for their political energy, and should be induced, when they have the leisure which wealth gives, to devote it with their influence and thoughts to the service of their own colony. The power of representing that colony in an Imperial Parliament would supply such an outlet. Instead of gradually losing

* ‘Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,’ Lecture xxii., app. p. 644.

all concern, and finally parting with their property, in the theatre of their early labours, they would have opened to them a noble object of ambition; they would be induced to keep up a constant connection with their old home, to study its interests, and advocate its claims in a manner more forcible than it would be possible for representatives of lesser weight to do. At the same time there would be no reason why the populace in the colony should hesitate to entrust to them their interests in the Imperial Government; for, whatever might be the different views of the various parties in the colony, it would be but very seldom that the interests of labour and capital would diverge with regard to the relative connection of the colony with the other parts of the empire. And it might not be without weight in the estimation of a colonial constituency, that the services of persons who would represent it with dignity in the most important legislative assembly in the world were to be obtained without cost or burden to itself. The advantage to the empire at large, in using for the general good these nearly wasted forces, would be very great. This class, attached to the mother-country, and rooted in the colonies, would form a constant link between metropolitan and provincial feeling, would encourage breadth of view and largeness of aim, even in local politics, and would exercise continually a mitigating influence in the disputes between neighbouring colonial communities, which form a serious danger to the maintenance of the Imperial tie. Of course it is not to be desired that all the colonial members should come from this class, but it would probably supply a considerable proportion.

In disputed elections in the colonies, it would probably be the best plan to let the facts be investigated and decided upon by the Chief Justice of the colony in which the dispute occurs. Though these judges are not necessarily appointed by the Imperial Government, the high character that they always bear would insure an impartial consideration even amidst political clamour.

Altered circumstances render it necessary to have altered rules, and it would probably be found convenient to give colonial constituencies powers of readily appointing substitutes for representatives to whom attendance in Parliament had become inconvenient. For such purposes the telegraph would supply useful assistance. It would be impossible, within these limits, to discuss all the details of change; but there are many changes which would require the greatest consideration and forethought, as it is upon the smooth working of the constitution that its success would depend; and in the state of our wide-spread dominions, many varied conditions must be provided for suitably, to prevent a breakdown in one part of the empire endangering the unity of the whole.

I will now endeavour shortly to consider the functions which would necessarily belong to an Imperial House of Commons such as I have supposed.

This Imperial House would, in the first place, undertake the supervision of the expenditure, and be the sole body capable of granting supplies and levying taxes for Imperial purposes.

With power comes responsibility, and if a direct share in the government of the British Empire be given by those who have hitherto been the sole possessors to their brethren in the colonies, these in turn are bound to bear their part of the expense of maintaining that empire, which, when the direction of its destinies was entirely out of their own control, they might plausibly have refused to do.

This reciprocal duty of colonists of granting funds for Imperial purposes, through their representatives in an Imperial Parliament, is probably that part of any such scheme as the present which will most attract attention throughout the empire, should it ever come to be publicly discussed. It will be urged in the colonies, and the cry will be repeated at home, that it is unjust to colonists to give to an assembly in which the members for any particular colony will only form a very small part, the power of taxation for purposes in which that colony has only a fractional interest. It will be urged that the value to the various members of the empire of the Imperial protection, and their interest in the objects for which expenditure is made, such as the annexation of fresh lands, the maintenance of communications, and the erection of fortifications, is in all cases different, and that it is beyond the power of a central authority to arrange taxation in an equitable manner.

In the first place, I may point out that the Imperial Parliament, as at present constituted, has had, and has, the absolute power of taxation in the colonies, without ever exercising it, though in the majority of cases it would have been easy to do so. It has also provided, through the taxation of its own constituents alone, the funds by expending which the colonies have been protected. Is it therefore likely that a Parliament only reformed by the introduction of representatives from the colonists themselves, would act in a manner unjust to those colonies? It must also be remembered that protection from foreign enemies, diplomatic representation abroad, and the other objects for which Imperial expense is incurred, are necessary to every community, a fact which has been proved in the case of the United States. Now the only course possible in the future, if the Imperial tie is not preserved, is that each colony or group of colonies should become separate and independent states, when they would have to provide these requisites for themselves at their own expense. I think it is indisputable, that in such a case, the cost would be far larger than where they would only have to provide their quota in the general expenditure. Of course it cannot be expected that the United Kingdom shall permanently find all the necessary funds for Imperial purposes.

Further, with respect to the want of equality of interest, I would remark that British lands are the outlet for the energy of the British race, in which all members have an equal interest, and though at one time, perhaps, expenses are, and have to be, incurred, which seem only to benefit one part or one class

of persons in Her Majesty's dominions, in the long run this is equalized, and the general expenditure proves to be for the equal benefit of all. I believe the truth of this reasoning might be shown by a detailed examination of English expenditure for Imperial and colonial purposes in past times, and the principle it represents furnishes one of the causes of the consolidation of the small states on the continent of Europe, which existed in the times of our ancestors, into the large empires which we have now.

The due adjustment of the incidence of taxation for Imperial purposes is, without doubt, a matter of great difficulty. Our empire is so vast, and contains so many and various stages of social, economical, and political progress, that it is perhaps rash to expect that any wide and general principle can be applied to all parts alike. If, however, it be once admitted that the interest of every subject of Her Majesty, wherever located, in the maintenance of the empire is the same, it is possible that some rule of taxation may be arrived at, which can be acted upon in the greater number of cases, and be subject to exceptions only where special circumstances occur, that in all probability time may in due course remove. If this could be done, a great step would be made in removing friction and promoting the smooth working of the entire system. It appears to me that a valuation, based upon the rateable value of property and the estimated incomes of all persons in each part of the empire, should be made at certain intervals under Imperial supervision, and that from this valuation the amount payable by the United Kingdom and by each colony, or confederated group of colonies, should be arrived at. The difficulties of making such a valuation would be at first enormous, and the principles upon which it should be formed would probably cause great discussion and debate; but if the plan were once adopted, these principles would gradually become settled and the imperfections be removed. Until then, some rough system of allotment must be adopted, in which the mother-country would not, we may be sure, err in want of generosity to the colonies.

But I believe although an Imperial Parliament may justly allot to a particular colony a proportion of the general taxation, that it is wiser to leave to the local legislature of that colony, the functions of determining in what manner it shall be raised there, and the persons who shall pay it, and of superintending the collection. In fact, the local legislature should be the body responsible to the Imperial Parliament for the due payment into the Imperial exchequer of the proper quota of the colony. In case of its refusal to do this, the Imperial Parliament, in virtue of its supreme power, could act as it should think most fit under the circumstances of the case.

The other functions of the Imperial House of Commons are the maintenance of those affairs and interests which may be considered as strictly Imperial, and for which the funds raised by it are applicable.

The first in order of these, is the protection of all parts of the empire from injury by foreign enemies, and the suppression of any insurrection or revolt of native people, beyond the power of the local governments of those provinces where such insurrections or revolts may occur. To fulfil this duty there will be required an army and navy under Imperial control, capable of defending and keeping up the prestige of the empire, of protecting its shipping and commerce, and of putting down the slave trade. Also, the maintenance of naval stations and military posts, wherever required by Imperial interests, and of the principal fortifications, arsenals, and dockyards in Great Britain and the colonies. While these are by far the most important items in Imperial expense, the burden of them would in a system of taxation, such as I have suggested, fall approximately upon those who would have to pay them in a ratio corresponding with the benefits conferred by the expenditure. In passing, I may remark, that such a system of Imperial forces would not prevent a militia being also maintained in each province at local expense. Such militia should, except during time of war, be under the orders of the local government, and should never without that government's consent be moved out of its own province. Minor fortifications might be provided for in an analogous way.

The next Imperial duty would be to support and regulate diplomatic and consular representation in foreign countries, and to maintain the machinery of the Foreign Office. No function of the government is more Imperial than this, and none would be more strengthened by colonial representation. At present there is scarcely as much disposition on the part of persons at home as is desirable to consider foreign politics in any other light than that of home interests. A change in this disposition would naturally be made, if the cost entailed by our foreign policy was partly defrayed by colonists. Our wide-spread dominions, extensive commerce, and mercantile marine, render the appointment of proper and sufficient consuls in foreign ports and cities of the greatest importance to the inhabitants of all parts of the empire alike.

The close political connection of the scattered members of the empire, knit together in one Imperial representative government, would cause the ready communication of the various parts with the centre, and with each other, to be a matter of the very highest importance. It would, therefore, be a duty of that government to watch over and, if necessary, to create rapid and certain intercommunications by means of steam and the telegraph, and to maintain convenient postal arrangements. No system would more promote and mark the unity of the empire, than one providing for the transmission of letters at one charge, say of a penny, from any one part of it to another. The cost of these works would be fitly defrayed by Imperial funds; but, under careful management, there is reason to believe that this branch of government might be made self-supporting.

One feature of Imperial government now exists, the right of every colonist to appeal from the local civil courts to the Sovereign in Council.* This has had great effect in keeping up in the minds of colonists a sense of connection with the mother-country, and the impartial manner in which the judges, to whom the Sovereign has confided the task of hearing appeals, have performed their duties, has generally caused both confidence in and attachment to the existing privilege. In a revised scheme of Imperial Government it would be convenient that a Court of Appeal representing the Sovereign should be formed by the fusion of the Courts of the Privy Council and of the House of Lords, which should command general respect, and decide causes sent on Appeal from every province of the empire. A court of this kind would supply the only means capable of preserving such unity in the law of the various parts of the empire, as at present exists, and of maintaining a Code of Common Law for all parts of the empire, if it should be found practicable at some future time to create one. The maintenance of this court and the salaries of the judges composing it would properly be provided for by the Imperial House of Commons. The same may be said of the office and necessary machinery of the Imperial Minister of Justice.

The duties of the Sovereign are, as has already been pointed out, in very great measure Imperial ones, and it is therefore reasonable that a large part at least of the income of the Sovereign should be a charge upon the empire generally, and be provided from Imperial funds. But as the seat of government is in the United Kingdom, and the relations of the Sovereign to the local government of that part of the empire must be different from what they are to those of the other parts where he is represented by a Governor only, we may suppose, that the United Kingdom would itself provide the remainder of his necessary income. It may possibly be found a convenient course for colonies to allot to the Sovereign unoccupied land, which should be inalienable by him, and might be managed either by his personal agents or by the government for his benefit. This plan might not at first be a profitable one in some colonies, as the land so allotted would remain unworked till the progress of the surrounding holdings of resident freeholders caused it to be valuable for leasing purposes. It would then enable the local government to provide for the Sovereign without expense to itself. I am aware that a plan, similar to that I propose, was tried in Upper and Lower Canada, and subsequently had to be abandoned. No doubt much would depend upon the nature of the colony and the land appropriated. In Australia, for instance, where unoccupied land is let to squatters for grazing purposes, and has to be given up by them to any persons who purchase the land from the local governments, there could be no

* It is true that appeals to the Privy Council from Canada are at present suspended, but that may only be a temporary measure.

difficulty in obtaining some immediate income from land appropriated to the Crown, and there would be less reason to fear that unoccupied tracts of land would stand in the way of local progress. In a more advanced state of development, these lands of the Sovereign might be of great public advantage, as has been the case with many Crown lands in England.

The Imperial Parliament would also assist in making the necessary provision for the members of the Royal Family, this being an expenditure also required for the support of the Monarchy.

The objects for which the foregoing Imperial expenses would be incurred, are such as affect equally all parts of the empire, and for them the Imperial House of Commons might justly obtain the necessary funds rateably from each local government. There are, however, other revenues raised and expended under the control of that House and of Parliament, viz. those of India and the Crown colonies. In the former, and in some of the latter dependencies, the relative cost of protection by army and navy is far greater than in the rest of the empire; and accordingly up to the present time the Imperial Parliament has, in virtue of its supreme power, raised by taxation in these places sufficient money to recoup itself for all expense of this protection; in fact, protection has been afforded not only without any pecuniary expense to the Imperial Government, but in some cases, with a profit to it. This practice will no doubt continue when necessary and possible, as it has many advantages, and India could not be governed without it. Moreover the position of those provinces of the empire which have representative local government must always be very different from the others, and legislation for them, including taxation, is carried on sometimes under the prerogative of the Crown, and at others by Acts of the Imperial Parliament. As the latter is in all cases supreme, and the power of the Crown is exercised at the advice of Ministers who have the confidence of the Imperial House of Commons, a substantial unity of administration exists. The system is anomalous, but it has worked well, and will probably be continued until the time arrives, if it ever does, when local self-government can be given to every part of the empire.

The Crown has now the power of granting local self-government to colonies without consulting Parliament, but cannot recall the grant without its consent. If, however, Imperial representation should be accorded to every colony having this right, it is desirable that the prerogative should be then exercised at the advice of the Imperial Parliament only, as otherwise the constitution of the Imperial House of Commons could be altered without its own concurrence. There is no reason to believe that Parliament would be unwilling to grant full representation wherever there might be just claims to it, but it is obviously a step which would require the fullest consideration.

In concluding these remarks upon the possible position of an Imperial

House of Commons, I may say that I assume that the privileges and prerogatives of the present House, and the relation that it bears to other branches of the legislature, would remain as now. They are the fruits of experience; we are accustomed to them, and they have been copied in both British and foreign constitutions all over the world. It is possible, however, that in carrying out reforms it may be necessary to consolidate into positive enactments what is now only custom and constitutional usage. This would be part of a system of codification, for which our law and people are nearly ripe. Imperial representative government would make it immediately necessary to have drawn up a code of Imperial law, incorporating all those statutes which apply to the empire at large; though a rigid expression by statute of the precise relations of the Imperial Ministers of the Crown to the representative House might be inexpedient. Those relations must, from the nature of things, remain very much as they are at present, as no government could either perform its functions or would be tolerated by public opinion, which did not act in harmony with the opinions of the majority of the House of Commons.

In thus sketching what I believe to be at once the most constitutional and the most practical means of giving to the colonies Imperial representation and responsibility, I do not overlook the difficulties which would have to be overcome in every stage of progress towards that result. But there are good omens for the future. No race has ever shown such self-restraint, forbearance, and spirit of compromise in politics as the English people, and these are the qualities of which we shall have need. To them, stimulated by patriotism, we may look for a successful end, both at home and in the colonies.

A few remarks remain to be made upon the second branch of reform of the present Parliament; the delegation of the control of purely local affairs in England, Ireland, and Scotland to a subordinate legislature.

The details of this change would be more conveniently discussed, and the Act of Delegation passed by Parliament before the admission of colonial representatives.

If a plan similar to the one sketched here were adopted, the ancient Parliament of England would have developed into a legislature wielding the supreme power in the widest and most important dominion in the world; while the care of the local interests of England, formerly the principal work of that ancient Parliament, would have become the duty of a dependent and provincial legislature. Such would be the fruit of the Imperial spirit in an Imperial race.

But this change need have no terrors for Englishmen at home. The empire is theirs, and they must for many years hold the preponderance in Imperial counsels. The seat of government being in England, they are at the centre of affairs, and reap the pecuniary advantage which this Imperial expenditure brings. And a great advantage to them would be to have the

undivided attention of a competent and distinguished Parliament on affairs of the greatest importance to their happiness and prosperity, which are now, of necessity, neglected. In settling the lines of this provincial Parliament, the aim to be kept in view must be to ensure as far as possible that the high character of the British Parliament be kept up, and that the local legislature may not degenerate into bodies of the stamp of our London vestries, or of the State legislature of the United States, but should contain and express the cultivated intelligence of the land. There is little fear of such a legislature not being sufficiently representative in the democratic sense. I would propose that, as far as possible, the present system should be preserved in the local Parliament, which should consist of Sovereign, Lords, and Commons, as now. The Sovereign, being resident in the United Kingdom, would naturally fulfil duties towards the local government of the United Kingdom similar to those he does at present, and to those performed by colonial governors appointed by himself at the advice of the Imperial Ministers. I do not think the theoretical objection which may be raised, that he would in this case be the servant of the Imperial Parliament, whose master in another capacity he is, and that the two duties might clash, is really of importance. Occasional difficulties might occur, but then it would be of great advantage to the State that a person whose deepest interest it was that no dead-lock should arise, should exist as a moderating influence upon both bodies. But under any circumstances, it would be most undesirable that a person other than the Sovereign should be appointed to such a position as that of local governor in the United Kingdom.

I would suggest that the members of the present House of Lords, together with those Scotch and Irish peers who have not at present seats in it, should form an hereditary House of local legislature, to which the Crown should have power to add fresh members, who need not be also members of the Imperial House of Lords. The same reasons exist for having an hereditary House of Peers in the local Parliament for the United Kingdom as for having one in the Imperial Parliament, and I shall not again state them. Such a House is not to be made off-hand, and it is peculiarly necessary that the class which forms our present House should both be interested and be able to act in local politics. It will of course be objected that the attention of the same men would be too much occupied in forming separate legislative bodies for Imperial and local affairs, and that too much power would be given to a class not always, from a democratic point of view, in sympathy with progress. To the first objection it may be replied, that the functions of the present House of Lords are more consultative than initiative, and this would remain the case; so that the labour of attending both Houses of Lords would not be so great as that of a member of both representative Houses. Moreover, different men would probably take the

principal shares of Imperial and local affairs. In process of time, also, the composition of the two hereditary Houses would become diverse, as old peerages became extinct, and new ones, confined to one particular House, were created.

To the other objection, I may say that the framework of modern society, the power of public opinion through the press, and the control of the purse, which is exercised by the representative House, elected on the widest basis of suffrage, altogether render it impossible that any progress or change, that the majority of the people desired, could be prevented by an hereditary House. On the other hand, thinking men are convinced that it is necessary for public safety that some constitutional check should exist, out of the power of the government of the day, to secure that measures of vital importance to the country should not be carried headlong, in a moment of popular ardour, before their real bearing and effect had been brought to notice by discussion and detailed consideration. Further, no power would be given to the class composing the hereditary House beyond that it possesses at present; the only change made would be that its exercise would be adjusted to meet modern requirements. The change involved in separating Imperial and local government would be quite a sufficient work in itself, without attempting to join with it the alteration of the balance of political power at home; a junction of the two attempts would only inflame party spirit, and render Imperial consolidation impossible. It might be advisable, in this case also, to give the Crown power to appoint a certain number of life peers.

Little change would probably be necessary in the number and mode of election of the members of the local representative Houses from that now existing in the House of Commons. I have before pointed out that, in our enlarged and varied community, there is no lack of competent men, with leisure and knowledge fitting them for being representatives, who would be willing to put their services at the disposal of the electors, and that the high character of the interests and principles involved would attract persons of the greatest weight. There could be no reason why the character of the House should be lower than that of the present one.

It might be found convenient that the Imperial and local Parliaments should meet in London, at different times of the year.

In the constitutional relations of the various branches of the legislature, it is probable that the model of the existing constitution would be followed. Local administration would necessarily be carried on by a Ministry who would retain office at the pleasure of the local Parliament. It would be necessary to revise the departments of State; but those which at present are solely concerned with local affairs would, of course, be controlled by a local Parliament. In the revision it might be possible to appoint Ministers for Scotland and for the Metropolis.

No doubt a point of some difficulty at the commencement of a purely local

Parliament would be to discriminate accurately between matters which are of Imperial interest and those which concern only local administration. There are many questions, such as free trade and laws relating to land, which are clearly of the greatest importance to both, and many others which lie on the border-line of both jurisdictions. Practice only would teach the exact limits which must be observed on each side; but it is obviously for the interest of all that powers as wide as possible should be conceded to the local government, and that the Imperial Parliament should not interfere with local authority, unless such interference was clearly called for in the interests of the empire at large. At the same time a legal dead-lock could not, under the plan I propose, occur, because the Imperial Parliament would as now be legally supreme over all local legislatures, even in purely local matters, if it should choose to legislate upon them. There are no people in the world who would more readily perceive than the English the true limits of Imperial and local affairs, or could more surely be trusted, in acting from either point of view, to keep those limits in practice.

Among the powers that ought most clearly to be confided to local Parliaments throughout the empire is that of amending and reforming their own constitutions. So long as the forms of representative government and allegiance to the Crown were observed, it could be of no Imperial interest to control any local development of government, and it would then be open to every province of the empire to modify its constitution according to its special needs. Nothing could be more dangerous to the stability and welfare of the empire generally than a desire for uniformity in its various parts.

But, on the other hand, the boundaries of each local government are certainly matters of Imperial concern. It is impossible not to foresee that a severance of the two functions of the British Parliament would be made the occasion of a fresh demand on the part of a large number of Irishmen for a separate local government in Ireland, apart from that of Great Britain. It is possible that such a separation would not, under these circumstances, be so injurious to all parties as it would be now; but probably the same reasons that have now so much weight will continue to prevent any form of repeal of the present union. But under any circumstances a separation of the governments of the two islands would be an Imperial as well as a local matter, and would have to be discussed on rather different grounds. The same question of boundaries must arise in many of the other provinces of the empire, as it has already done. At present no change can be made in these boundaries without the consent of the English Parliament. The Imperial interest in this is solely that of the majority of the parts composing the empire, whose desire it must always be that every part should be as strong and as rapid in its development as possible, provided that in so doing no counterbalancing harm be done to other parts.

It must always assist the due development and smooth working of the whole of the empire that those parts which touch each other, and have common interests, should be so far united in local government as to ensure a uniform policy being adopted with regard to public works, trade regulations, and other matters. It will, therefore, be the general interest either that each local government should be as large as possible, or that systems of colonial confederation, like the Canadian, should be adopted. By having large areas for local government, many of the effects of the local selfishness prevailing in small communities, which might cause serious difficulties to the empire, would be avoided. But it would be most unwise for the Imperial Government to press confederation or union upon adjacent colonies before such a step is largely supported in the colonies themselves. There is often a certain repulsion from each other existing in neighbouring colonies, where outsiders would suppose that, from interest and common origin, the inhabitants would naturally be attracted towards each other. A premature attempt to promote confederation would both fail of success and cause the Imperial Government to be unpopular. I have seen it asserted that Imperial consolidation was not possible until some system of intercolonial confederation had been previously adopted. It is difficult to see the grounds for such a statement, and I am convinced that it is erroneous. In fact colonial confederation would probably be rendered much more easy by Imperial representation. At present the sole connection of the various colonies to one another is as being co-dependencies, and containing co-subjects of the Crown; while, with colonial representation in an Imperial Parliament, their representatives would sit there side by side—a fact which would have some effect in removing mutual jealousy. When confederation or union of colonies became expedient, it would be pressed and carried by the colonists themselves, with every necessary help from the Imperial Government. Confederation of groups of colonies has been urged in the interest of common defence against external enemies or native races, which became necessary, as the Imperial Government declined the duty of protection. In a consolidated empire, where the central government undertook to protect all parts alike, this would be less immediately necessary.

With regard to the local governments other than that of the United Kingdom and Ireland, no change would be necessary. The Governor of each would continue to be appointed by the Crown, at the advice of the Imperial Ministry, and would, as now, watch over affairs in the Imperial interests. He would also, in the absence of some other arrangements between the Imperial and local governments, be the Commander-in-chief for any local militia and forces.

The regulation of the franchise is a question of very great difficulty, and must differ in almost all our colonies according to the circumstances of each. This is shown by the fact that no two of them have now precisely the same

constitutions. The presence of a large native population in many of them of itself causes distinctions according to the nature of the races composing them, and their progress in civilization. These difficulties exist now, and must be met, whether Imperial consolidation is accomplished or not; but there is no reason to suppose that it would do other than help their solution.

It will be well for a moment to look forward to some of the most immediate and certain results of Imperial consolidation; and, in the first place, to the pecuniary position of the empire. While I think it is clear that a care for the pocket is not the sole argument which will prevail in determining the course of a people, and that those persons err vitally who consider that the nation's affairs should be guided purely by economical reasons, disregarding the more constant and permanent instincts of race, and aspirations after an Imperial destiny; it is also necessary to watch well that these diverse feelings should not clash, and that neither our people, nor a section of them, should ever have deliberately to balance one against the other. So to arrange is one of the first requirements of good government. It will at all times need much care to do this in so widely spread an empire as ours. But it is essential that, at the outset, our colonists should not look to Imperial consolidation as bringing to them an enormous liability from transactions in the past, in which they have had no say. Nothing would make the prospect of Imperial representation more distasteful to them than to suppose that any part of the public debt of the United Kingdom would be laid upon their shoulders. This debt now amounts to about £770,000,000, and the interest upon it is solely paid by the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. Adam Smith, in the last chapter of the 'Wealth of Nations,' in arguing in favour of the union of Great Britain with Ireland and the then existing colonies under a centralized government, says:—"It is not contrary to justice that both Ireland and America should contribute towards the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That debt has been contracted in support of the government established by the Revolution, a government to which the Protestants of Ireland owe not only the whole authority which they at present enjoy in their own country, but every security which they possess for their liberty, for their property, and their religion; a Government to which several of the colonies of America owe their present charters, and consequently their present constitution, and to which all the colonies of America owe the liberty, security, and property, which they have ever since enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire; the immense debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that contracted in the war before, were both properly contracted in defence of America."

Though so many changes have taken place since 1776, when this passage

was published, much of this reasoning still applies, and might be regarded now if it were possible to organize the empire and determine the liabilities of its several parts from a strictly logical standpoint. It is true that much of our debt has been contracted for purposes which affect the interests of the colonies as much as those of the United Kingdom, and for wars, of which the only permanent result to Great Britain has been the acquisition of some of the colonies themselves. It is true that but for the annual expenses incurred by England in maintaining and protecting her colonies, a large amount of the debts contracted in time of war might have been paid off in time of peace. But what statesman dare, with hopes of success, go to the colonies offering them a share of Imperial Government with one hand, and a share of our national debt with the other? In reality, it is no hardship to England that she should retain the sole responsibility of her debt. Under present circumstances she could never look to do otherwise, as she cannot practically tax the colonies to meet that or any other object. And in making Imperial reform it would be a graceful act, suitable to her dignified and parental character, that she should take upon herself the burden of the past, while her children, though sharing her glory, have only the brilliant hopes and prospects of the future.

But with regard to any debt incurred by the Imperial Parliament subsequently, the case would be different. No province of the empire would incur any debt except for local purposes. If it should become necessary for the Imperial Government to borrow, the debt would be contracted by the whole empire, and would be met by Imperial taxation in the usual way. A new stock would be created. The effect upon the old stock, which exists at present, would probably be to raise its value, as no more money for wars and the other purposes which have been hitherto the principal causes for borrowing would be needed; and therefore the stock would not in future be liable to increase to the extent it has hitherto done. The value and popularity of the new Imperial stock would depend upon the view of the stability of the consolidated Imperial Government taken by the investing classes. If this were a favourable one, this stock would also probably be more valuable than the old United Kingdom stock, as besides the United Kingdom, the rising colonies would also be liable. In this case, the pecuniary position of both Great Britain and of the empire at large would be improved.

I think there can be no doubt that Imperial consolidation would increase the estimation in which Great Britain is held by foreign nations. This would happen, perhaps, not so much because the immediate physical power of the empire would be increased, but because there would be a pledge that the development of our race would go on without hindrance, and that its future strength would not be wasted and split up by disintegration and internal quarrels.

Imagination has great weight even in diplomacy, and the minds of foreign

statesmen would be impressed with the vision of our mighty empire, its peopled continents and countries throughout the world, knit together firmly in one harmonious whole. Until now they have, instead, looked forward to the time when England, shorn of her crown of colonies, despised and treated with ingratitude by the children that she has brought forth, should sink into a Holland or a Denmark, a memory of past glories, and a lesson for the ages to come. That this would be the result if all our dependencies were parted from us, and were ruled by governments animated by the jealousy of their mother-country, which the policy of the United States Government has undoubtedly shown, is, I fear, more than a possibility; but a popular belief that it would be so is the best surety that such a partition shall not occur. To no power would the change be more beneficial than to the United States themselves. We have no really antagonistic interests, and ought mutually to rejoice in each other's prosperity, which, after all, is the common glory of our race.

And, with regard to our foreign policy and general interests, a close political union with our colonies would give such a definite character to our national aims that neither we ourselves nor foreign countries in regarding our policy could stand in doubt, as all do at present, as to what it is we really value and would defend at the cost of war.

It would be, perhaps, a rash prophecy to say that any principles of government are so unalterably settled, that it is certain that a supreme Imperial Parliament would insist on their being recognized in every part of the empire by every local Government. There are, however, a few fundamental rules which we at present maintain everywhere, and which I believe will rather increase than loosen their hold upon the public mind in England. They are, Representative Government, Personal Freedom, or absence of slavery in any form, Humane Treatment of Native Races, and Toleration of all Religious Opinions. To these may perhaps be added, Free Trade. All these matters are of Imperial importance, and concern either the national conscience or interest.

The first—Representative Government—has already been sufficiently discussed.

There is no principle of political morality with which Englishmen now-a-days more universally agree than with the maxim that Slavery is itself a wrongful practice—of such a character that no compromise may be made with regard to it. Though this national conviction is not one of very long standing, there is no other moral principle which we have carried to all its consequences so unhesitatingly and so thoroughly. With regard to it, we have acted as national proselytizers; we have not, as in the case of the truths of Christianity, contented ourselves with the peaceful persuasion of private missionaries, but we have carried the gospel of freedom, *vi et armis*, with fire and the sword. We have rooted out the unclean thing from our own dominions at great cost and

with unsparing hand. And yet there exists a danger that without the exercise of a watchful eye we may in some parts of the empire find ourselves gradually permitting some of the features of slavery. The temptation to this is very strong in those parts where we have at once a virgin and fertile soil, and a climate so hot as to incapacitate persons of European descent from out-door bodily work. The importation of labour, of the Indian Coolie to Ceylon, the Mauritius, and the West Indies, and of the Polynesian to Queensland, is, though a most proper and useful practice both for the employer and the employed, still one which for its proper regulation requires an active and organized supervision on the part of the Imperial Government. It is the common habit of mankind to fail in recognizing the injustice to other and inferior races of systems to which they are accustomed, and from which they derive pecuniary advantage. It would have been difficult to get the planters in Jamaica and in the Southern States of North America to acknowledge the unfairness of the state of society in which their lot in life was cast. It would therefore be scarcely prudent to leave to the local governments, composed in a great measure of the employers of imported labour, the task of regulating the traffic in which they have such an interest. For in some circumstances the pecuniary interest of the masters may become opposed not only to the happiness and comfort but to the very existence of the imported labourer. We cannot suppose that the Imperial Government would, as at present constituted, act *less* rigorously in suppressing any practices analogous to slavery in any colony than it would do if the colonies were granted representation in an Imperial Parliament. But, in the former case, the Government would act with this disadvantage, viz. that the colony, which might consider itself aggrieved by an interference of which it might not recognize the necessity, would have no constitutional means of bringing its views to bear upon the Government, and thus general dissatisfaction would be caused. If, however, the colony were able, through its representatives in the Imperial Parliament, to express its wishes and to ensure that the real facts relating to any question at issue were known, it would more readily listen to the views of the majority of the empire as there expressed, and acquiesce in the measures adopted.

The same may be said of the Humane Treatment of Native Races in and adjoining our colonies. Experience has already shown how precarious is the position of aboriginal and uncivilized tribes in countries colonized by European peoples. In those countries where the climate allows Europeans to settle and increase, it has been the almost invariable result of colonization that the aboriginal races have gradually died, or are in process of dying out, except in cases where they have been artificially protected in a state of dependence. This decline of aboriginal races has not been less experienced where they have come in contact with the English race than in other cases, but rather more so. Perhaps even our repression of slavery may have tended to this result, as

it has prevented the compulsory employment of natives, the only means by which they can usually be induced to do organized work, and thus has caused the settlers to regard them as mere cumberers of the ground, and hinderers of the progress of civilization. There is no more likely cause of disturbance between the colonies and the mother-country than the treatment of these aboriginal races. No doubt in all our colonies a much higher standard of the duty which we owe to these weak and defenceless residents in lands formerly their own now exists than was formerly the case with the pioneers of our earlier colonization, and the barbarities which have exterminated the native populations of Tasmania, of Newfoundland, and of great parts of the continent of North America are not likely to be repeated. But the causes which produced them are still at work in other of our colonies. Indeed, great practical difficulties have to be met, as by the increase of the European population land becomes scarce, and, in consequence, that occupied by the remaining natives becomes more valuable. The present treatment of the Red Indian tribes in the United States, and of the South African Caffres by the Boers of the Transvaal shows what a policy might be expected if the persons who are immediately brought into contact with inferior races were allowed, uncontrolled, to act as interest and temporary expediency might prompt. I believe that public sentiment in England would revolt against the manner in which there is a strong tendency in some colonies to treat the natives; and that large numbers of persons at home would rather see a dismemberment of the empire than allow dealings with aborigines, which they would consider wicked and unjust, to take place under the shadow of the British flag. It would, under present circumstances, be unwise for the Imperial Government to interfere minutely in the relations of local governments with aborigines in their provinces; but it is bound, for the credit of the empire, to keep a watchful supervision over native interests. Mr. Merivale indeed says: * "That the protection of natives should in all cases be withdrawn altogether from the colonial legislature and entrusted to the central executive, is a principle in which I think even the most jealous friends of colonial freedom must acquiesce. One of the most useful functions of a distant central authority, counterbalancing to a certain extent its disadvantages, is to arbitrate dispassionately between classes having so many mutual subjects of irritation." And, subsequently, in the appendix to that lecture (p. 518) he says: "It cannot be doubted that a consistent and regulated system of management of the natives by the home authorities would be better, as regards justice towards the natives, than the arbitrary will of the settlers." But he admits that there appeared little hope, from the weakness of the Imperial Government, that this desirable system would ever be adopted. I believe it would now be impossible for the Imperial Government generally to take the

* 'Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,' Lecture xviii., p. 495.

arrangements with native races into its own hands, but there is one contingency in which it is bound to do so, that in which it is necessary to defend the colonists by military force from native attack or revolt. It is frequently in these cases that the feelings of colonists are most strongly excited against the native races. The true remedy lies in a stronger and a representative Imperial Government. It is not likely that an Imperial Parliament with colonial representatives would take a less humane view of our duty to aborigines than the present one, but it would speak with far more authority, and would be credited by colonists with greater knowledge of the real state of the various parts of the empire. I believe that such a Parliament could, without taking away any authority possessed by local governments, by its expression of opinion alone, secure that native interests should be treated with more consideration than at present; and that if it became necessary for it directly to interfere, it could do so with greater assurance that its decisions would be cheerfully accepted.

There is fortunately less likelihood that any difference of opinion could arise between the Imperial and any of the local governments as to the fullest toleration of religious opinions of every kind, and to their public exercise, provided this did not involve the commission of acts contrary to public policy or decency, or to humanity. We have fortunately no European religious body within our empire whose creed is connected with a practice so opposed to public interest and law as the polygamy of the Mormons, which, I believe, would be tolerated neither by home or colonial sentiment; but if such a sect were to arise, and become numerous in any of our colonies, it would clearly be a matter of Imperial interest to decide how far the practice of polygamy should be allowed within any of the dominions of the Crown. In this case, also, the presence of representatives of the provinces specially affected would be able to assist the Imperial Parliament in coming to a wise decision.

Free trade does not, perhaps, properly come within the same category as the principles first enumerated, as it is one which has not been hitherto practised or enforced as part of our system of Imperial Government. Taxation has been considered as a local question entirely within the province of each local government, which has looked only to its own interests, apart from the effect that its financial policy might have upon other parts of the empire. This has been the natural result of England's own mercantile policy, which, until a comparatively recent time, made its tariffs and commercial laws solely for the advantage, as it was then considered, of English merchants, without consideration of the industrial interests of either the colonists or of Ireland. In both cases, however, there has been the same principal cause, namely, that the local bodies who made the taxes, tariffs, and laws, have regarded their own interests as separate from those of their fellow subjects who happen to live outside the boundaries of their own province, although those boundaries were sometimes of an entirely arbitrary kind.

It is of the deepest importance to the empire that its various parts should so order their fiscal arrangements as to interfere as little as possible with the progress of the others, and so of the whole. It is admitted that the effect of free trade is generally to increase the commerce and prosperity of the world: the arguments now used against it lie as to the effect that it may have upon the position of limited areas. It is urged that as the effect of free trade is to cause production of commodities only where they are to be produced at the cheapest rate, and to discourage the production of them where local manufacturers will be undersold by importers from abroad, it may be the true interest of inhabitants of these latter places, to protect such local industries in order that, in case of enforced isolation from other places, they may have the means of supplying all their wants. It is also urged that it is the interest of every province or area of local government to be self-supporting, as the result is that suitable employment will then be found for all the inhabitants, each of whom may not be fitted to take part in the production of the staple for which the province is best fitted, and with which it can undersell other places. These arguments presuppose that the interest of persons is confined to that of the locality within which they live, a proposition I do not believe to be true of any community in the world, and which certainly is not so of citizens of the British Empire. The real interest of an Englishman, whether living in England or in the colonies, is that of the empire at large. He cannot, without showing the most short-sighted selfishness, limit his sympathies to the part of it in which he happens to live. The interest of the empire at large is that each part of it should be encouraged to the utmost to produce those commodities for which it is best fitted by nature, and so to develop itself as rapidly as possible. This can only be done if the other parts take as much of its productions as they can, and if it devotes the whole of its energies to do that which it can do best. A very simple example of this exists in the relations between England and her Australian colonies at the present time. The progress of Australia in a very great measure depends upon its finding sufficient markets for its wool and its meat. These it finds in England. But England can only buy the products of Australia by the profits, and for the purposes of her own manufactures and commerce, a considerable part of which spring from intercourse with Australia. If Australia then artificially protects its own manufactures in which it is undersold by England, it reduces its power of producing wool and meat, and also the profits of England, which she thereby prevented from purchasing the products of Australia to the extent it did before. On the other hand, if England, anxious to be self-supporting in the matter of food, artificially protects her own farmers, then it will be impossible to feed the multitudes employed in her commerce and manufactures, which will dwindle away, leaving no market for Australia. When Australia's economical position becomes suitable for manufactures, they will arise by natural growth without protection.

A most remarkable practical proof of the advantages of free trade has recently been shown in the relative progress of two Australian colonies, New South Wales and Victoria, the former adopting a free trade and the latter a protective policy. In the five years from 1870 to 1875, the exports of New South Wales, with free trade, increased 83 per cent., while those of Victoria only increased 16 per cent. The shipping of the former also increased 48 per cent., and that of the latter 25 per cent., in the same period. The relative increase of New South Wales in other respects has been little less remarkable. The taxation in New South Wales is at the rate of £1 18s. 3d. per head, while in Victoria it is £2 2s. 9d.

The same arguments apply to the relations of all parts of the empire with each other.

With free trade the empire will be self-supporting, though each part of it may not be so by itself. We must trust to our great navy and extensive mercantile marine to keep open communications between the various parts, which will thus attain their highest possible development, and the different wants of the large populations which must result will always provide suitable employment for every person. The cost to the empire of the largest navy will be nothing compared with the enormous pecuniary advantages derived by it from *Imperial free trade*. At the same time it does not follow that it would be wise for the Imperial Government to press free trade against the wish of the colonists. It would possibly have been politic for that government, in granting representative local government to each of the colonies having that privilege, to have provided that the local government should not have the power of imposing prohibitory duties upon goods coming from other parts of the empire ; but this opportunity has been allowed to pass, and we have to regard each of those colonies as practically independent of Imperial control in the matter of taxation, and as accustomed, by its means, to interfere with the free course of trade. There is no necessity, however, why such restrictive measures on the part of the colonists should be passed without notice by the Imperial authorities. England has long been in the habit, by its ambassadors, of pressing upon the notice of powerful European Governments the injury that their protective commercial systems were doing to English manufactures and to the production of raw materials in English colonies, and it has frequently succeeded in obtaining modifications of those systems. The Imperial Government would be at least entitled to use the same pressure upon colonies of the empire that it does upon foreign and independent States ; and it could do so with the greater force, that its efforts would be made on behalf of interests in which the colonists shared, and to which they could not become politically opposed. As public opinion in the colonies is the eventual arbiter of all disputed questions, such pressure would be suitably and sufficiently exercised by a statement by the Imperial

Government of the evil effects caused, in their opinion, by the taxation or Customs' duties complained of, to the general welfare of the empire. This statement might be addressed in the first place to the colonial government, and then published for the consideration of colonists. It can scarcely be expected that Imperial consolidation would of itself immediately cause the colonists to abandon their protective measures; but it would have this good result, that they would be encouraged to regard the relative interests of their own and of other provinces of the empire from a broader and less exclusive point of view. From this, and also from the progress of economical knowledge, we may expect the gradual adherence of all local governments to the munificent principle of free trade.

It now only remains to consider the means by which Imperial reform can be carried into effect. And the first requisite for this result is that there should be a general opinion, both at home and in the colonies, that such a reform is necessary and practicable. For this purpose every speech of a public man, every article in a newspaper, and every book, which has the effect of drawing the attention of men of British race to the relation of England and her colonies does a public service. As might be expected, the colonists, who have their relations more often brought to their notice in a practical way, have taken the lead in insisting that some closer connection between the various parts of the empire is demanded by Imperial interests. The Royal Colonial Institute in London has greatly contributed to a healthy state of opinion in colonial affairs, and has been the means of bringing together, for the exchange of ideas, residents in the most opposite parts of the empire. Some of the members of the Institute are much in favour of Imperial confederation for the empire, involving Imperial representation of the colonies; though, as far as I am aware, no elaborated scheme, nor consideration of details, has yet been made. Though our objects for the consolidation of the empire are the same, it will have been seen that the arrangement I have here sketched can in no sense be called Imperial confederation.

A federal system, or confederation, in its nature presupposes that each member of it is an equal and independent party to a contract by which the confederation is formed, and has theoretically the same right to secede from the union that it had to enter into it. The United States of North America is legally a confederation of equal States, and the late war by which the secession of the Southern States was suppressed was, constitutionally, an illegal war, and was opposed as such by the strict constitutionalists in all the States. Moreover, in a confederacy, no change of the basis upon which the union is formed can properly be made without a reassembling of the equal and independent parties to re-settle the terms of the contract. No doubt in practice this is often avoided, but it is always with inconvenience and with a straining of the strict letter of the law—ever an undesirable expedient. These evils are constantly

liable to appear in confederations, and almost always do so in one form or other. In dissensions between the whole of the parts, the victory is usually with the central authority; but it is at the expense of much ill-feeling, and of the convictions of some of the most worthy members of society.

Fortunately the present position of the British Empire allows us to obtain all the advantageous results of confederation without its dangers. We have now a Sovereign and a Legislature "in these her realms, and all other her dominions and countries, over all persons, in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as temporal" supreme; and we are accustomed to see that supremacy exercised in all the empire in a manner agreeable to all classes of her subjects. It is possible that by these means a union of all the dominions of the Crown may be made with the same consent of the various parts that a confederation implies, but in a legal form at once more stable and more elastic. It is indubitable that, in strict constitutional law, the Queen in her Imperial Parliament might reorganize the empire, by granting the Imperial suffrage to the colonies, without consulting the colonists at all, and the latter would be guilty of rebellion in resisting any of her decrees thus made. But with semi-dependent and at the same time loyal states as the colonies are, such a course would be equally unwise and unjust. What can be done is, that when the colonists have arrived at the state of mind which would have impelled them, if they were independent parties, to confederate, the Queen and her Imperial Parliament shall pass an Imperial Act which of its own force shall knit the empire into a compact whole, legally unassailable at any future time by any dissentient part. In this case, if any dissatisfaction arose, and a part of the empire attempted to secede from it, the sympathies of all constitutionalists would, unlike those of the United States, be always against secession. And also, unlike the United States, where the rigidity of the constitution is, and probably will continue to be, a danger to progress and order, the Imperial constitution could be modified by the supreme authority to suit the changing circumstances of the empire without either illegality or scruple. I know of no attributes of a wide representative government more likely to produce permanence than these. The modern tendency on the Continent and elsewhere towards the political unity of races has not expressed itself in the form of confederation, but rather in that of a central government, with an Imperial head for certain Imperial purposes; and this has been shown, undoubtedly, to produce a stronger government than a merely federal bond can do. What is wanted is not Imperial confederation, but Imperial reform, which, both as a word and a thing, is more suited to our traditions and wants than the former.

We may hope that the Royal Colonial Institute will continue its efforts in favour of Imperial representation of the colonies; and in consequent discussions by men acquainted both with home and colonial opinion, the plan for its accomplishment most suitable to the position of the empire will be arrived at.

Though many of the most enlightened colonists are already alive to the necessity of some change, and are pressing the matter into notice, it has not been found that the colonial political class, as a rule, have advocated any steps for bringing the colonies into closer relation with England, and the reason for this is not hard to seek. The position of a politician acting in the government of one of our colonies is one of great importance and dignity, naturally cherished by its possessor. If he is a far-sighted man, who looks forward with confidence to the great future that awaits his colony, he is naturally anxious that his name should be associated in the minds of posterity with the history of its early fortunes. He therefore is tempted to regard with suspicion any measure which he fears might have the effect of taking any of the control of those fortunes which he now has out of his hands, and thus reducing his actual and historical claims to notice. That these fears are really unfounded where such extensive powers of local government must always exist I have already endeavoured to show, and that the effect of colonial representation would really be to offer a political career far more magnificent than at present to a colonist of first-rate abilities; still, I fear it cannot be doubted that this reform would encounter the opposition of a section at least of the colonial political world. No change of magnitude can be carried out without interfering with some apparent interests. However, if the matter were formally before colonial notice, we might reasonably expect that parties would be divided on this as on every other subject, and that, if reform were opposed by the colonial government, it would be supported by the colonial opposition.

The difficulty lies in this, neither at home nor in the colonies is there any wide-spread dissatisfaction with the present state of things. Everyone admits that it is only a temporary state which cannot in its nature be of any long continuance, but few people have any notion of what may be the result, or would be willing to take steps towards a great change purely from speculative reasons. On the other hand, if some real cause of dissatisfaction with the present connection of the empire were to arise either here or in the colonies, hostile feelings would be aroused on both sides, which would throw the greatest difficulties in the way of making any Imperial reform or preserving our present unity. This has been already proved by our experience in the disputes with our American colonies, now forming the United States. There is also this further difficulty in the case of our present colonies. They have the additional reason for satisfaction with the present state of affairs, that they now have all the benefit of England's great Imperial expenditure without contributing anything towards it, while they have, at the same time, the most complete autonomy in their own internal affairs. In any possible scheme for Imperial unity some provision must be made for their providing a share of the funds required for this expenditure. Would the colonists then consent to a new system, entailing this burden upon

them, unless they were compelled to do so by some urgent cause, such as pressure by the Imperial Government? The only means of pressure upon the colonies open to the Imperial Government would be to threaten to withdraw the protection now afforded by Great Britain, and thus to compel them to incur much greater expenses in providing separately for themselves all the requisites of protection and government than they would undertake in simply contributing to the Imperial exchequer. But this would be to threaten a dismemberment of the empire, a catastrophe which it would be the special object of any reform permanently to avert; and I am convinced that public sentiment in England would never sanction such a course being taken. It is probable that threats of any kind on the part of the Imperial Government would tend, as the separatist policy fashionable in England some time ago undoubtedly did tend, to weaken the attachment of the colonists to the mother-country. If the colonists believe that England is unfeignedly anxious, even at the cost of much expense and trouble, to retain them in union with herself, they will be much more willing to meet her just wishes. Those of British race will be generous to those who act generously and openly towards them. If, therefore, the full facts connected with England's share in Imperial government were laid before them, and were discussed calmly without any pressure, the reasonableness of their assisting her in her great work would be admitted, and colonial governments would be forced by public opinion in the colonies to unite with the Imperial Government in carrying some comprehensive and suitable Imperial measure. Moreover, colonists will be anxious in time to be rid of the kind of quasi-dependence to which they are subject at present, and to have personally some share in directing the affairs of the great empire of which they form so important a part. When this anxiety becomes strongly felt, as it undoubtedly will be, if no great disputed question should previously arise to estrange colonial attachment from the mother-country, they will be met at once by the obvious difficulty that they cannot in fairness ask for power without being willing at the same time to undertake some of the consequent responsibilities.

To the two noble motives, desire to have a share in the Imperial government of their race, and justice towards the mother-country, who has long protected them at her own expense, I look, as the mainsprings which shall induce the colonists to support a fair and lasting Imperial union.

With people living in the United Kingdom, the position is altogether different; for them Imperial consolidation would bring with it, not a new liability to taxation, but a renunciation of power. And, no doubt, parting with exclusive power is always accompanied with a pang, as we see in the case of the monarch who finds himself obliged to submit to the pressure of a popular assembly. But none the less is it often necessary to do it, and wise to do it with a good grace. And there never was a renunciation of power to which those who

make it, need look with less apprehension. For it is the admission by a parent of the children that he has reared, to share in a great enterprise and in mighty aims. To them he relinquishes some of the control and some of the glory, and to them he looks in their young strength for help in the burden and heat of the day, to maintain not only the glorious work that he has created, but to carry it where even his strong arm alone cannot reach. We in England should no doubt lose our exclusive right of determining the foreign policy of the empire, but that policy would be strengthened by the very loss, and we should show a fatal short-sightedness, if for the sake of the sole exercise of Imperial power we threw away any opportunity of engaging our colonies to cast in their lot with us, both for better and for worse. Most truly did Burke, in his speech for conciliation with the American colonies, say, on March 22nd, 1775,* "As we must give away some natural liberty to enjoy civil advantages, so we must sacrifice some civil liberties for the advantages to be derived from the communion and fellowship of a great empire."

I have already pointed out, in discussing the effect of Imperial consolidation upon the colonies, that the difficulty most likely to hinder their acceptance of any scheme for it will be that they must undertake at the same time a share in Imperial taxation, which has been till now the burden of the United Kingdom alone. It must not be supposed that the acceptance of a share of this burden by the colonies would cause a corresponding alleviation of the Imperial taxes paid in Great Britain. It is probable that these would at least be as large as at present, if not more so.

One of the consequences of the existing unsettled relations of the colonies to the mother-country is, that defences by fortification, coaling stations for ships of war, and necessary communications by telegraph, are, especially as regards the Australian colonies, either non-existent or greatly deficient, over large areas, which would have to be defended by us in time of war. This deficiency has lately attracted a good deal of attention, but nothing has yet been done really to meet the difficulty in a sufficient manner. The colonists have neglected to do for themselves what it was imagined might be done for them by the Imperial Government; and the latter has naturally objected to spend English money on what appeared to be really a local concern. And besides these existing deficiencies, fresh centres of wealth are day by day arising in most of the colonies which will render necessary constant additions to the defences that are now required. Though under a centralized Imperial Government, it will probably be found practicable to make a certain class of military fortifications a purely local charge, there is much to be done in the colonies, the expense of which would properly fall on the Imperial exchequer. The colonists would justly expect that upon their contributing to the Imperial funds, steps should at once be taken to provide for their security,

* 'Burke's Speeches,' vol. i., p. 327.

and they would press their wants through their representatives in the Imperial Parliament, in a manner not likely to be neglected.* But as the United Kingdom must, for a good many years to come, still provide by far the largest share of the Imperial funds, it is likely not only that all colonial contributions would in reality be spent in the colonial interest, but that a considerable part of those obtained from the United Kingdom would go to the same destination. The people of Great Britain, therefore, cannot be attracted to a support of Imperial unity by the prospect of a diminution of their burdens (except, as I have already attempted to show, in the matter of their funded debt), and they must consequently look, for the advantages of such a scheme to themselves, to other considerations. And what these considerations are, no one who has followed in history the course of England, since her people became a nation, can doubt. For it has been prompted by a spirit working within, passing on from the fathers to the children, and ever showing itself from age to age, in varied and diverse forms. This spirit is the spirit of empire, and it lives not in the brain of the despot, but in the heart of the people. With the government, or without the government, it has worked its way, and it will work its way still. No English monarch has been permanently popular who lacked this spirit, and it is an essential qualification of a great Minister. With the two great weapons of trade and colonization, it is gaining the supremacy of the world; and no force has yet appeared which can check its march onward. It aims at empire, not for the glory which is attained thereby, nor for the simple pleasure of ruling over wide lands and numerous races, nor for the tribute of peoples; but that it may assimilate other races to the English race, and enforce their obedience to laws of action that Englishmen have evolved for themselves, and wish to see everybody else follow. But like all great forces, it shows no haste, and works on, biding its time. It is to this powerful spirit of the empire of race we must look as a principal cause, not only to make Imperial unity possible, but to force it into a reality.

There would be also material advantages to Great Britain in such a union, which cannot fail to have their weight. The easing of the over-worked and over-weighted machinery of her present Parliament; the strength that she will draw from her increasing colonies as time rolls on; the sense that they can never become her enemies, and that with their help her work may indeed develop in new channels, but can never decay, and is ensured against the weakness of old age; these are considerations which may well influence a nation that has done much in the past, and has much to show for it in the present, but

* Probably one of the greatest difficulties in the working of an Imperial Parliament with colonial representation, would be at the commencement, in moderating the demands made by outlying provinces upon the Imperial exchequer, without at the same time causing local dissatisfaction.

who knows, or ought to know, that what has been gained has been out of all proportion to the little geographical space which has produced the men that have gained it, and that they have been aided in their work by physical and other causes unlikely to exercise the same weight in perpetuity. Indeed, Imperial unity is the only fitting climax to our noble history in the past. England has only once really failed in her functions of government, and though that failure occurred with regard to her dependencies, she has learnt and profited by it. But she has to prove to the world that she is able, besides providing freedom and tranquillity at home, to consolidate her empire on the basis of that freedom and tranquillity. Without Imperial unity, she will have shown herself able indeed to sow, but not to reap. And the harvest ought surely to be near; it is ready to our hand. Other nations have achieved the union of the branches of their races under one government by violent revolutions, by wars, by annexations, and with the greatest difficulties. We have the union already made, and have only by wise reforms to render it permanent and put it out of the reach of danger. Let us seize the present moment for these efforts, when the empire is tranquil and progressive; when no great question of home politics disturbs our minds; when faction is hushed; when no controversy exists between the Government in England and any province of the empire; when those who would dismember the empire have been tried and found wanting; and when Englishmen, both at home and in the colonies, so readily admit the advantages they gain from allegiance to a common Sovereign. Let us not wait till the blood is heated by disputes which the present uncertainty may any day produce. Our experience in America shows that an arrangement is then impossible, and that experience is the best guide to the future.

No doubt the change would be in a certain sense a revolution; but the history of the English people has been one long series of revolutions carried on often imperceptibly, and preserving order and old names and associations. Such revolutions were the emancipation of the villeins, the reformation of the Church, the amalgamation of Scotland and of Ireland with England, and the gradual assumption by the House of Commons of the supreme power in the State. These revolutions are not to be feared, and with them the word is robbed of its sting.

And how can these great reforms be made? I would reply, in the same manner, that all great reforms are made in these islands and among men of British race, by the Legislature, after the public have become convinced by means of general discussion that they are necessary and practicable. The first step is the forcing of the questions at issue upon the public mind at home and in the colonies; the second is the determination of the form in which change can safely and wisely be made. In both these the help of the Ministers of the

Crown is needful. And at present there is little doubt that it would be accorded by Ministers of either of the political parties that Her Majesty can summon to her service. There is no substantial difference in the present policy towards the colonies advocated by either of them. And there is no measure that British statesmen could carry which would be so glorious as this; as it concerns the deepest interests of their country and people, not only now, but in the most distant future; and it would affect, perhaps more profoundly than any other political course open to human action, the destinies of the world at large. The Minister who should succeed in carrying into effect the political consolidation of the British race would earn for himself an imperishable name, and the era in which it was accomplished would merit the respect of posterity. The course which has been taken by Lord Carnarvon, in South Africa shows what an able and disinterested Colonial Minister may do in educating and convincing colonial opinion in favour of a wide and beneficent scheme of comprehension; and the same process is possible with regard to a wider and more important scheme for Imperial unity. Probably, the most reasonable course, if a Minister were willing to promote such unity, would be that he should send out to the colonies, to which it was proposed to offer Imperial representation, the draft of an Imperial scheme for public information and discussion, and should request the colonial legislatures to send to England delegates to explain the feelings and wishes of their colonies upon the subject. It is possible that intercommunication between the delegates of the various colonies, the Ministers of the Crown, and other home statesmen, might have the effect of smoothing difficulties and promoting the spirit of compromise, most necessary to complete a work of such magnitude.

For the interests of England we may hope that the question may never, at home, be made one of party. It is a national question, and the interests, sentiments, and sensibilities of so many communities of Englishmen are affected by it, and have to be considered in the discussion upon it, that violent party opposition, or harsh words on the part of prominent Englishmen might produce complications which would destroy all chances of success, and perhaps lead to the dissolution of the empire.

I believe no motion in favour of the consolidation of the empire, by giving the colonists Imperial representation, has been brought before the House of Commons in recent times, but such a motion would be of great service, as it would induce a discussion which would put before the world the advantages which might be gained, and the difficulties which have to be met, in the accomplishment of Imperial reform. If these pages should have the effect either of inducing any member of Parliament to undertake such a motion, or of bringing the enormous interest which the people of Great Britain have in the adoption of a sound basis of union with their brethren in her dependencies, in

any way to the notice of the public, they will have fully attained the purpose of their author.

In conclusion, I would point out that if in spite of difficulties and opposition the genius of the English people should succeed in accomplishing this crowning work in their political development, there would be at least this pledge of its stability and permanence, that it would have on its side the only great principle which has in modern times proved strong enough to cause either the formation or the disintegration of states—a community of race and language. And, if we ask whether this success would result in the moral, intellectual, and material benefit of the race that it more particularly concerns, and of the world at large, I think that the deeds of England in the past, and the spirit in which she now looks forward to the future, will unite in giving an affirmative reply.

Note upon MR. GOLDWIN SMITH'S Article in the 'Fortnightly Review' of April 1st, 1877, upon the 'Political Destiny of Canada.'

Since nearly the whole of the foregoing pages were written, Mr. Goldwin Smith has published an article containing reasons why, in his opinion, the Dominion of Canada, in particular, and incidentally also, why the other English colonies cannot in the future be united with Great Britain and each other under one Imperial Government. He regards the hope of colonial representation as an extravagant dream. But when his reasons are examined, I think they will be found by no means of crushing weight. Mr. G. Smith well says, and I for one entirely agree with him, "The great forces prevail. They prevail at last, however numerous and apparently strong the secondary forces opposed to them may be. They prevailed at last in the case of German unity and in the case of Italian independence. In each of these cases the secondary forces were so heavily massed against the event that men renowned for practical wisdom believed the event would never come. It came, irresistible and irrevocable, and we now see that Bismarck and Cavour were only ministers of fate.

"Suspended, of course, and long suspended by the action of the secondary forces the action of the great forces may be. It was so in both the instances just mentioned. A still more remarkable instance is the long postponement of the union of Scotland with England by the antipathies resulting from the abortive attempts of Edward I., and by a subsequent train of historical accidents, such as the absorption of the energies of England in continental or civil wars. But the Union came at last, and, having the great forces on its side, it came for ever."

Mr. Smith then states that the great forces are in favour of the separation of Canada from the English empire. It is a little remarkable that the only

instances he gives of great forces in the foregoing passage, are those that have compelled the political union of the various branches of one race under one government. But the great forces on which he relies for compelling the separation of Canada from the empire, are, its distance from England, the divergence of interest and the divergence of political character of Englishmen living in those two parts of the empire, and lastly the attractions presented by the United States, with their identity of race, language, religion, and general institutions, to those of Canada, together with economic influences. Mr. Smith's opinion is a valuable one where it has been formed from facts which his residence in Canada and the United States of America has brought under his notice. His views are, however, here founded upon what he considers general possibilities, of which persons who have not resided in America may form as valuable opinions as himself. He is a witness to the existence of a strong Canadian feeling in favour of a continued connection with England, and to the "glamour of British association." His political predictions and wishes are on one side; the evidence that he is compelled to bear as to actual facts, is on the other. His local knowledge, however, enables him to show that certain forms of the Unionist feeling are of secondary and transient importance; but he entirely puts out of sight and undervalues the great force which is at work to prevent disintegration and create unity, and which, aided by the secondary forces, that he admits together make a strong cable, may be found of supreme importance—I mean the love and the power of race.

Of geographical distance, as a great force, he finds little else to say than that "few have fought against geography and prevailed," while he admits that increasing skill is likely to increase our powers of intercommunication by steam and telegraph, though he thinks the cost of transit will not be lessened. In truth, the ocean is no real barrier between England and America; it is our safest and best highway. It is an unfailing permanent road which requires no money to keep it fit for travelling, and which, to a great naval power, can be closed neither by public nor by private enemies. With no land between, we are adjacent countries. The strongest argument against Mr. Smith's views for the future is, that with far inferior means of communication than those which are now open to us, the union has continued to exist in the past. If England's distance from America is what Mr. Smith calls geography, then we have fought against it, and have prevailed.

With Mr. Goldwin Smith's next great force, of "divergence of interest," it is still more difficult to deal, for he does not say much more about it than that such a divergence exists, and is as wide as possible both in diplomatic and economical questions. It is difficult to see why Englishmen in Canada have nothing to do with the European and Oriental concerns of England, and with the development of their race in other parts of the world. As a matter of fact,

however, such is not their opinion. Mr. Smith points out and laments that the Canadian has not such an exclusive attachment as he would wish to Canada, as the sole country round which his feelings of patriotism should cling; but he does not see that the cause of this is that the Canadian feels he is a member of a great and a wide-spread race, and owes attachment, not merely to the fortunes of the land upon which he resides, but to the race of which he is proud to be a member. That he lives where he does is an accidental circumstance; his relationship to the other members of his own race is a force out of his own control, affecting nearly every sentiment and hope that he has. Certainly Mr. Smith's way of regarding national ties is not the way of his countrymen, and helps to show his want of sympathy with their feelings. That he apparently thinks it possible that the Chinese may ultimately be allowed to expel people of the British race from the Australian colonies, and that the unassimilated Irish may take their place in the United States, and possibly in England herself, is an example of the unsympathizing and jaundiced view with which he regards the progress and aspirations of his fellow-countrymen. Such is not the spirit in which Englishmen have made their way in the world, and will continue to make it.

The remissness that may possibly have been shown by the Imperial Government in the advocacy of the claims of Canada, in dealings with the United States, would be remedied by the colonial representation that I have attempted to urge in the foregoing pages; it has occurred, when it has, not so much from diversity of interest, as from want of some recognized way by which the Canadians could make known their wishes and wants in England.

It is scarcely an argument against the permanent unity of the empire that Canada has retained the same currency that it had previous to the secession of the United States, and which was inherited by both of them from the original Spanish colonizers of America.

It is undoubtedly in the power of the United States to interfere with and injure the trade of Canada by hostile duties, trade regulations, and the shutting up of their markets; but even Mr. Smith does not appear to suppose that Canada could be coerced into secession from the empire, and into a union with the States, by such means. It is more reasonable to believe that the people of the United States will come to see that their real interests lie in favour of free trade, and will enter into commercial treaties with the British Empire for the general advantage. Such treaties are far more likely to be negotiated by the Imperial Government, acting in the interests of the empire at large, and of the bulk of all the United States' customers, than by the government of Canada alone, which represents a very small part of them. I would also remark that it yet remains to be seen what will be the effect upon the United States themselves of the increased value which is now set upon the blood-relationships in the

various peoples. It is not at all likely that they will be unaffected by it; in fact, there are signs that the consciousness of a common race with ourselves is already having some influence there; and if this is so, we need not expect that United States' influence will be used towards weakening the general power of their brothers remaining within the British Empire, and of which power they themselves reap many of the advantages.

Mr. Smith's third great force, the divergence of political character between the citizen of the Old and the citizen of the New World, is one still more likely to be attenuated as time goes on. He evidently conceives the English Government to be based upon feudalism and aristocratic pride, and therefore to offer the most marked contrast to the democracy and equality of the colonies. Whatever may be thought of some of the hereditary forms of English society, the policy of the government in Imperial matters, and domestic too, is as democratic, and in favour of free government, as that of the most popular republic. With regard to the government and its policy, aristocracy in England merely means that there is a supply of honest and educated men to fulfil the popular will in public affairs. It does not, and would not, affect Imperial policy, that England and Scotland have each of them an Established Church; and an hereditary Imperial Chamber could no more alter the course of affairs to suit aristocratic prejudices than the House of Lords does at present. Besides this, the representatives of the various colonies would bring with them to the popular House their own modes of thought, and would be a sufficient counterbalance to any retrograde tendencies on the part of the Home Ministers. If they should at the same time imbibe some of the high notions of political and personal honour which have so long distinguished English politicians, in place of the unscrupulosity and corruptness of which Mr. Smith accuses those of Canada, he would probably consider it an advantage to America.

With regard to the attractions of the United States, which Mr. Smith thinks will prove an irresistible force, all predictions, Mr. Smith's included, are mere guesses in the dark. Those attractions are not at present of great power, as Mr. Smith's whole paper bears unwilling witness, and there seems but little to attract in the immediate future. A divided people, a huge debt, gigantic profligacy in all branches of the executive government, are not things of a character to allure free and contented neighbours, who share but in a small degree in such curses, to a more intimate union with them. But these things are marked features of the United States as a community. The present commercial depression there, though no doubt only temporary, shows that republican government and boundless land are no preventives of the most serious evils which occur in modern civilized life. At the same time I am quite willing to admit that if under present circumstances the tie which binds Canada to the rest of the British Empire were loosened by the upsetting of the

British Monarchy in a revolution at home, or by any other cause weakening the cohesion of the British race, the attraction to the United States, if they remained in their present form, might be too great to be resisted. If, however, some such Imperial union as I have urged should be adopted, it is more probable that the attraction to the rest of the British Empire would remain in the preponderance, and the circumstances under which the United States could exercise a superior influence would never arise. In such a case the attractive force might be found acting upon, rather than from, the United States themselves.

Mr. Smith asks what has been the destiny of colonies down to the present time, and what has become of the American dependencies of Spain, Portugal, France, and Holland? The colonies of Spain, except Cuba, have no doubt separated from her, but it was not until, by continued intermarriage with the native races, the people of those colonies had become Spaniards in nothing but name, and the principle of race had become a repellent instead of an attractive power. The government of Mexico since the separation from Spain has for considerable periods been carried on by full-blooded natives. The same has been the case in some of the South American States. There is surely no analogy between these instances and British colonies where no such deterioration of blood has taken place. In Brazil and the Portuguese colonies the same extinction of pure European blood had occurred before their separation from the mother-country, and the relation of Brazil to Portugal was further complicated by dynastic disturbances. The colonies of Holland we have mostly ourselves acquired by the fortune of war, and are gradually assimilating the Dutch people there to the English type. Such a conquest of our own colonies by another nation does not at present appear probable. The lost colonies of France have been likewise either annexed by us like Canada, or seized by an over-mastering inferior and alien population like San Domingo. In Canada, as Mr. Smith points out, the French population remains practically unassimilated by the surrounding English one, and is no doubt a disturbing factor in the development of the Dominion in a British mould; but this would be equally the case if it were joined to the United States, the only other possible course for it. Besides, the United States would be far less likely than the Imperial Government to allow the continuance of the separate and ancient institutions to which the French Canadians are much attached, and the fear of a disturbance of these privileges would always of itself prevent them from intriguing for the separation from the empire and a union with the neighbouring people. I think it is clear that the causes which have produced the separation from themselves of the colonies of those other European nations do not exist to disturb the connection of British colonies with the mother-country.

As Mr. Smith aspires to the character of a political prophet, it is worth while to notice the manner in which some of his past prophecies appear to be

working their fulfilment. In 1863, he published in a work called 'The Empire,' some letters which he had written in the previous year to the newspapers upon the subject of our colonial sway. In the Preface, p. xxi., he says: * "If in the midst of the vast revolution which is going on over the world, the almost invisible filaments of political connection which still bind England to her colonies should at length cease to exist, and if she were to find that a few military positions no longer answered the purpose for which they had been occupied, or repaid the money they cost, history a century hence would not number *this* amongst the greatest events of an eventful age, nor give it so large a space in her record as she will give to other things of which England itself is the scene." Here Mr. Smith evidently connects, as likely to be contemporaneous circumstances, the snapping of the tie which unites England to her colonies, and the abandonment of her military positions in them. The latter has almost universally taken place, and yet the tie remains stronger than ever. In one of the letters, on page 10, Mr. Smith says, that Lord Palmerston, though youthful in bodily vigour, was old in ideas, and unconscious of the great moral and material changes that had taken place in Europe since he first entered public life: and then proceeds, "But he will be succeeded, probably, by statesmen more imbued with the ideas and alive to the exigencies of our own age, and, depend upon it, such statesmen will be disposed to retrench our empire in order to add to our security and greatness." Lord Palmerston passed away twelve years ago, and five Ministries have since directed the fortunes of Great Britain; but her empire has been increased and not retrenched by them, and no government which showed a desire to diminish Her Majesty's dominions could stand for a session of Parliament. So much for Mr. Smith's predictions; but he sings the same song still.


Mr. Smith, in his recent article, asks if a great effective union of all the provinces of the British Crown could be made, what would be the good of it? I have attempted in the foregoing pages to point out the many and most important benefits all branches of our race would receive, and I will only repeat now, that it would ensure that civilization should proceed in a smooth and even manner; that one colony of Englishmen should not cut the throats and destroy the progress of other colonies of Englishmen; that the prosperity of Englishmen in one part of the world should be made conducive to the benefit of Englishmen in another, and the general and united progress of Englishmen, to the benefit of the world; that the great and humane principles of government which Englishmen have discovered, and upon which they act, should be observed in the future development of their race, and that they should be encouraged to take wide views and exhibit broad sympathies rather than to narrow the sphere of their influence, and to limit their power of good by local and often short-sighted selfishness.

* The *italics* are my own.

If the prospect of the whole and united British race moving onward together in peace and in happiness to higher developments of civilization and social progress, produces glory to the people that exhibit it, so much the better, for it will be glory of the truest kind. But to the race, with such a prospect before it, that chooses from timidity, from selfishness, from want of a wide and noble aim to refrain from encountering the difficulties through which it may be realized, no glory will be accorded either by bystanders or by history; but it will be regarded as another instance of a people to whom vast opportunities were accorded, but who were not strong or good enough to avail themselves of them.

And if such a prospect were realized, might not the mother-country share in that glory? There would be a sufficient material advantage in it for her to satisfy the requirements of Sir George Cornwall Lewis, which Mr. Smith quotes; for she would secure for herself in a couple of small islands a right to the protection, the care, and the respect of her children inhabiting half the world.

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